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This dissertation encompasses three papers. My first paper assesses film mak-
ers' choices on product quality and variety in film production. Production budget and
genre are used to represent quality and variety, respectively. My research is unique
in that it exploits the peculiar lack of price variation in the film industry, as ticket
prices are the same for each film. I construct a theoretical model of duopoly compe-
tition over genre and budget rather than the traditional focus on price. The model
predicts that an increase in expected demand will result in an increase in the budgets
of the films, as well as an increase in the difference in budget and genre between films.
I empirically test these predictions using data on film release dates, budget, genre,
and both expected and actual weekly number of tickets sold. The empirical findings
confirm the predictions from the theory. If the expected demand of the release week
increases by 1%, on average the budgets of the films that will release that week will
increase by 0.66%, the difference in budget between the films will increase by 0.83%,
and the genre similarity in percentage value will fall by 10.31 percentage points.
My second paper follows the idea of Corts (2001) on vertical market structure
in the U.S. film market. In this paper, I examine the effect of vertical market structure
and vertical integration on the competition of release dates of all wide release films in
the U.S. in 2014 and 2015. I discover that applying the approach in Corts (2001) to
recent data, the result is inconsistent. However, after bringing vertical integration into
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consideration I show that films with different upstream or downstream firms generally
do not reach efficient outcomes in release date scheduling, which is consistent with
the findings in Corts (2001).
My final paper examines the effect of expected release week demand on film
studio’s decision on film release and the number and variety of films released that
week. It is expected that when demand is high, there would be more films released
and more variety among them. However, in the U.S. film market, during high demand
weeks, the number of films released is usually low comparing to other weeks. I find
that if expected demand increases, the number of films released that week declines,
along with the variety of the films. Evidence shows that when expected demand
increases, there will be a film with extremely high production budget, and there will
be fewer options in variety left for the other films since they need to differentiate
themselves from the high budget film in terms of variety. Furthermore, two films
similar in variety would be released far from each other in order to avoid direct
competition. Therefore, in high demand weeks, the high budget film ”crowds” other
films out of the market, the number of films would decrease as well.
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Chapter 1
Quality and Variety: Evidence
from the U.S. Film Industry
1.1 Introduction
Consumers are concerned about both variety and quality of the goods they
consume. For example, there are various kinds of motor vehicles to be chosen, such
as sedan, SUV, convertible, and so on, and these motor vehicles can have different
qualities depending on the auto parts used in them (a better engine or compressor,
leather seats etc.). Existing literature has focused mainly on this two-dimensional
competition, mostly modeling two firms in a single market.1 Neven and Thisse (1990)
found that in a duopoly market in which consumers are concerned with both variety
and quality, there exists a price equilibrium and firms choose maximum differen-
tiation along one of the two characteristics and minimum differentiation along the
other. Zeithammer and Thomadsen (2013) examined how consumer preferences for
variety affect competition between two quality differentiated firms. They argued that
preference for variety can either increase or reduce price competition and can even
1
result in firms choosing the same quality. Irmen and Thisse (1998) expanded the
two-dimensional competition to a multi-characteristics competition, and concluded
that firms choose to maximize differentiation in the dominant characteristic and to
minimize differentiation in the others when the salience coefficient of the former is
sufficiently large. Additionally, prices do not necessarily fall when products get closer
in the characteristics space for price competition is relaxed when products are differ-
entiated enough in the dominant characteristic.
Each of these articles focuses on markets with price variation and price com-
petition given quality and variety differentiation. However, in some markets or in-
dustries, unified prices are charged for final goods or services; for example, the U.S.
film industry.2 The film industry in the U.S. has long been an interesting subject to
economists. Its annual box office revenue can be as high as $10 billion, with more
than 150 wide releases in cinemas each year.3 Film production budgets can vary
from less than $1 million to over $300 million, and there are various genres including
comedy, action, drama, romance, animation and so on. Seasonality is also important
in the film industry. Each week the number of potential consumers, or what I call
market demand level, is different; in weeks which people have more leisure time such
as Independence Day, Thanksgiving, Christmas and summer break for students, the
demand is extremely high. Given the number of films released, the number of weeks
each year and the high payoff, multiple films are released each week and competition
1Including Capozza and Order (1978), D’Aspremont et al. (1979), D’Aspremont et al. (1983),
Osborne and Pitchik (1987), Tabuchi (1994), Vandenbosch and Weinberg (1995), and Bar-Isaac
(2009). These papers developed the research on two-dimensional competition based on the Hotelling
Model, however, they all focused on markets with price differentiation.
2One can see any movie (except for 3D) at the same price in cinemas.
3A movie is considered to be a wide release when it plays in 600 cinemas or more in the United
States and Canada.
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among them can be intense. So, consideration of the above facts motivates the fol-
lowing questions. What competition strategies do the film makers choose for their
movies? In particular, how do film makers choose the budget and genre, and how
does the expected demand of the release week affect their decision?
I begin by developing a theoretical model of two film makers, each releasing one
film, competing on genre and quality, without price competition. The model is based
on Neven and Thisse (1990). Films, like many other goods, have two features that
consumers desire, variety and quality. In my analysis, differences in genre represent
the variety in films offered, and budget serves as a proxy for quality.4 I contribute
to the literature by examining the effect of expected market demand level on film
makers’ decisions over variety (genre) and quality (budget). I define each week as
a market, with different expected market demand. The model predicts that a low
quality movie will follow a high quality movie into the market, and its optimal genre
and quality will be in response to the choices of the high quality movie. The producer
of the high quality film makes its optimal choices by predicting the choices made by
the producer of the low quality film.
The theoretical model predicts that the quality of films will increase if the
expected demand of the release week increases. When the expected market demand
4It is worth explaining that quality is ex-ante quality which occurs up to a year or more before
the film is released. Therefore, there is no way for producers to know at such an early stage what
the eventual reputation of their film will be. Thus, this ex-ante quality is only correlated with
production budget, with higher quality consisting of factors such as a better director, better actors,
better visual and sound effects and so on.It is important to point out that this ex-ante quality should
not be confused with IMDb scores, Rotten Tomato scores, and so on. These scores reflect the ex-post
quality of films, which can only be revealed after the films are released, and have no direct relation
with production budgets. The ex-ante quality examined in this paper only relates to production
budget, which in the empirical studies is used as a proxy for ex-ante quality.
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is large, the studios are willing to increase the budget to raise the quality level in
order to acquire more market share and earn more profit. Also, the quality difference
between the two films will increase as the expected market demand increases. The
high quality film will attract more viewers in weeks for which demand is expect to be
high. As for genres, the difference in genre between the high and low quality films
will increase as the expected demand of the release week increases. The low quality
film’s budget is thus much lower than the other film’s in weeks with high expected
demand, so the low quality film must differentiate itself even more in terms of genre,
since it cannot offer a lower price at the box office.
To test the predictions from the theoretical model, I collect data to measure
quality and variety. As noted, my measure of ex-ante quality is film budget, while
my measure of variety is genre difference. The data are collected from Box Office
Mojo, IMDb and IMDbPro and include all wide releases from 2007-2016, their release
dates, genres, production budgets, company credits and so on. Also, I collect weekly
numbers of tickets sold from 1996-2015, in order to calculate the expected market
demand level of each week. These data allow me to empirically examine, under
different market conditions, how films compete on quality and genre and how their
decisions are affected by other factors.
My empirical tests confirm the theoretical predictions. I find that all films,
including high and low quality films, tend to have higher budgets (quality) when the
expected demand of the release week is high. The genres of a high quality film and a
low quality film are also more differentiated if the expected demand of their release
week is high. Also, although not predicted by the theoretical model, the genres are
more differentiated between two low quality films when expected demand of their
release week is low.
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Past literature has examined many aspects of the film industry.5 Orbach and
Einav (2007) looked into the phenomenon of uniform prices for differentiated goods
in the U.S. film market. Corts (2001) examined the release-date scheduling of motion
pictures in 1995 and 1996 in the US and found that complex vertical structures
involving multiple upstream or downstream firms generally do not achieve efficient
outcomes in movie scheduling. Einav (2010) developed an empirical model to study
the release date timing game between film distributors, and the results indicate that
box office revenues would increase if the distributors moved the release dates of some
films one or two weeks away from major holiday weekends since there are too many
films crowding around. Dalton and Leung (2017) focused on the release gaps of
Hollywood blockbusters in the U.S. and other foreign markets. They highlighted
three factors, namely release gap effect, word-of-mouth effect, and competition effect,
and examined how do they impact distributors’ release gap decisions and box office
revenue.
My work differs from the previous articles in that I develop a theoretical and
empirical model to investigate the optimal quality and variety choices in a market in
which unified prices are charged. While the results on quality (budget) choices are
not surprising, the variety (genre) choices are different from the conclusions provided
by past literature. It is expected that if maximum differentiation is observed in one
dimension, then differentiation should be minimized in the other, but my findings
conclude that quality (budget) and variety (genre) differences change in the same
5Beside the literature mentioned above, Hanssen (2002) and Hanssen (2009) focus on contracts
and vertical integration, De Vany and Walls (1996) examines the box office revenue distribution,
Filson (2005) looks into the effects of vertical integration in the industry, and Gil (2009) investigates
movie distributors and their contracts with exhibitor and shoes that integrated theaters run their
own movies longer than other movies, and longer than non-integrated theaters do.
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direction according to the expected demand of the release week. These new findings
are discussed in the following sections.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 discusses the
theoretical model of competition between two films with both horizontal and vertical
differentiation without price variation, and the predictions for strategic budget and
genre choices of the films. Section 1.3 describes the data and variables used in the
empirical tests. Section 1.4 discusses the empirical strategy for identifying the effect of
expected demand of the release week. Section 1.5 presents the results of the empirical
tests. Section 1.6 concludes. Additional details are included in the Appendix.
1.2 Theoretical Model
The theoretical model of strategic budget and genre choices among films in
the U.S. in this paper is a heterogeneous duopoly model, allowing for both horizontal
and vertical differentiation. The setup of this model is based on the model presented
in Neven and Thisse (1990). Some alterations to the model have been made in
order to identify the effect of weekly expected demand on films quality and genre
choices. Most importantly, the nature of the U.S. film industry is such that ticket
prices are unified meaning one can see any film in the cinema by paying the same
price.6 This assumption is crucial, not only because it is true for the film industry,
but because it differentiates my model from situations considered in past literature.
Finally, although this model is being discussed under the framework of the U.S. film
industry, the model and its conclusions may also fit in other industries with similar
characteristics. For example, the video game software industry.
6Sometimes ticket prices may vary across films due to passes, coupons, discounts and so on.
However, these situations are not common. Also, ticket prices may vary across cinemas, but in a
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1.2.1 Model Setup
1.2.1.1 Horizontal and Vertical Differentiation
I consider a duopoly model with only two films released each week, indexed
by j ∈ {1, 2}, competing with each other. The films can be defined by two different
characteristics, variety and quality, which are differentiated horizontally and verti-
cally, respectively. In the application to films, variety is genre, and quality is ex-ante
quality. Higher ex-ante film quality means better actors, a better director, better
visual and sound effects, and so on. Thus, since quality cannot be quantified and
those better features cost more, film budget will be used as a proxy for quality in
the empirical analysis. Furthermore, the decision of which week to release each film
is assumed to be exogenous to each films variety and quality decisions. Therefore,
instead of producers choosing an appropriate future week for their films with variety
and quality already decided, producers choose release weeks exogenously including
weeks with both high and low expected demand, then decided the variety and quality
of each film according to the expected demand of the release week.
The range of genres is defined by the [0, 1] interval. The placement of genre
on the [0, 1] interval does not represent a better or worse genre, when comparing one
to another, but consumers do prefer some genres to others, and the preference across
different consumers can be rather different. The range of qualities is represented by
the interval [q, q̄], and all consumers prefer a high quality to a low quality given the
same genre. Each film j therefore is characterized by its genre, yj, and its quality, qj,
with (yj, qj) ∈ [0, 1]× [q, q̄].
given cinema, one can purchase any film ticket at the same price.
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1.2.1.2 Consumer Preferences
Consumers have preferences along both dimensions. First, each consumer has
a desired genre, or a most preferred genre, x, with x ∈ [0, 1]. Also, each consumer
has a valuation of quality, which is the marginal utility of quality, θ, with θ ∈ [0, 1].
Therefore, consumer i, which is type (xi, θi), receives the following indirect utility
from seeing film j
uij = R + θiqj − (xi − yj)2 − pj, (1.1)
where pj is the ticket price of film j, and R is a positive constant which represents
the income of each consumer which is large enough to ensure them to see a film.
The consumers will choose the film for which utility is higher. In addition, the con-
sumers which are represented by the parameters (xi, θi) are assumed to be uniformly
distributed in the unit square market place since (xi, θi) ∈ [0, 1] × [0, 1], with x on
the horizontal axis and θ on the vertical axis. Therefore, with the above setup it is
possible to describe the aggregate demand of each film released in a given week. With
the indirect utility function given in Equation 1.1, it is possible to find the marginal
consumers who are indifferent between purchasing a ticket for films 1 and 2. The
marginal consumer i has ui1 = ui2, which
R + θiq1 − (xi − y1)2 − p1 = R + θiq2 − (xi − y2)2 − p2, (1.2)
where p1 = p2, since a consumer can see any film at the same price. Rearranging the
terms in Equation 1.2 yields a description of the marginal consumers in terms of θ(x)
θ(x) =




Between the two films released in a given week, without loss of generality, I assume
film 2 has a higher quality, which q2 > q1. Thus, film 2 is the high quality film, film 1 is
the low quality film, and producers of both films know this. The producers decide the
films’ genre and quality level (budget) based on the expected market characteristics
such as demand in the release week.7 Also, for simplicity, I will mostly focus on when
y2 > y1, since the other situation y1 > y2, which is symmetric to the previous one,
can be easily shown by rotating the parameter space around the vertical axis. Under
these assumptions, θ(x) is linear and downward sloping, a non-increasing function of
x.
All the consumers in the unit square market place can be divided into two
groups, as shown in Figures 1.1-1.4. The consumers, with any x ∈ [0, 1], will choose
film 1 if they have θ ∈ [0, θ(x)], and the ones that go see film 2 have θ ∈ [θ(x), 1].
It can be seen that consumers with a high valuation of quality are more willing to
choose film 2 (the high quality film) and less willing to see film 1 (the low quality
film) in terms of genre.
1.2.1.3 Four Scenarios in the Market Place
Depending on the slope and intercept of θ(x), there will be four scenarios, and
the aggregate demand derived in each situation is also different. All four scenarios
are depicted in Figures 1.1-1.4. The first scenario, in Figure 1.1, has θ(x) intersecting
the left and bottom sides of the unit square that represents the market space with
the conditions 1 >
y22−y21
q2−q1 > 0 and 1 >
y2+y1
2
> 0. The shaded area under θ(x) are the
consumers with certain types (x, θ) that would choose film 1, the low quality film.
The second scenario is in Figure 1.2 which θ(x) intersects the top and bottom sides
of the unit square, and the third and last scenarios are in Figures 1.3 and 1.4 which
7Expectations are used since the time they make the decision is far before the release week.
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θ(x) intersects the left and right sides, and intersects the top and right sides of the
unit square, respectively. The mathematical conditions of each scenario are given in
Figures 1.1-1.4 under the graphs.
However, Scenarios 3 and 4 should be excluded, they share the mathematical
condition y2+y1
2
> 1, but yj ∈ [0, 1] for any film j. The intuition is that in these two
scenarios θ(x) intersects with the right side of the unit square, implying that film 1,
the low quality film, will attract all the consumers with some levels of valuations of
quality (especially the ones with low valuation), no matter what their genre preference
is. This is impossible since the low quality film cannot steal all the consumers from
the high quality film for if a consumer is indifferent between the genres of the two
films she would choose the high quality one, not to mention if she prefers the genre
of film 2. Hence, only Scenarios 1 and 2 will be presented.
1.2.1.4 Timing
The game has three stages. In the first stage, for a given future release week,
the producer of the high quality film decides and announces its genre and quality
(budget is used as proxy). In the second stage, knowing the high quality film’s
decisions, the producer of the low quality film decides and announces its genre and
quality. In the last stage, the release week comes and both films are released. Usually,
high quality films announce their genre and quality a longer time prior to their release
date. One reason is it often takes a longer time to produce these films, and another
reason is that the high quality films wish to scare off some competitors by doing so.
In contrast, low quality films announce rather close to their release date since it takes
less time to produce, and they want to make sure no high quality film follows them
into the market. It is worth mentioning that the producer which wants to release a
low quality film will never announce first, for if it does the film maker that aims to
10
make a high quality film, by knowing the genre and quality level of its rival’s film,
will produce a film with the same genre but a higher quality thus will capture the
entire market.
1.2.2 Quality and Genre Choices in the Two Scenarios
1.2.2.1 The First Scenario: 0 <
y22−y21










where s is the expected market demand level of the release week. Since each point in
the unit square market space represents a different type (x, θ) of consumer, s is the
mass of consumers on the interval that week. Thus, a high value in s indicates there
are many people willing to see a film in that week. In high demand weeks, such as
midsummer weeks or Christmas, we can expect the market demand level to be high.
In addition, since genre and quality choices are made before the film is produced
which is a long time before the release week, producers will have to form expectations
about the demand of that week. Also, (x̃, 0) is the intersection between θ(x) and the
horizontal axis. Because we have a unit square market space, the aggregated demand





Equations 1.4 and 1.5 yield
Done1 =






(y2 − y1)(y2 + y1)2s
4(q2 − q1)
, (1.7)
respectively. The total cost function of film j is
TCj = F + ajq
2
j , (1.8)
where F is the fixed cost, cj is the marginal cost of quality, and cj = 2ajqj which the




1 − TC1 =
(y2 − y1)(y2 + y1)2sp
4(q2 − q1)
− F − a1q21 (1.9)
and
πone2 = sp−
(y2 − y1)(y2 + y1)2sp
4(q2 − q1)
− F − a2q22 (1.10)
where p is the ticket price which is the same for both films. For film 1, the first order
conditions of πone1 with respect to q1 and y1 are
∂πone1
∂q1











For film 2, the first order conditions are
∂πone2
∂q2








= − [(y2 + y1)
2 + 2(y22 − y21)]sp
4(q2 − q1)
< 0. (1.14)
Given the above first order conditions, first, combine Equations 1.11 and 1.13, yield
a1q1 = a2q2. (1.15)
Since q2 > q1, it must be that a1 > a2. This shows the producer of film 1 intends to
produce a film with relatively low quality since its marginal cost of quality increases
relatively fast. On the contrary, since the marginal cost of quality increases more
slowly for the producer of film 2, it produces a film with a relative high quality.
Furthermore, Equations 1.11 and 1.13 lead to
q1 = (












The genre choices are more complicated with respect to quality. The producer
of film 1, the low quality film, according to Equation 1.12, would like to choose a genre
relatively different than film 2, the high quality film. On the other hand, inequality
1.14 shows the profit of film 2 increases as its genre y2 is closer to 0. This implies that
under the condition y2 > y1, the producer of film 2 will try to make its genre as close
to 0 as possible for it wants its genre to be as close to the genre of film 1 as possible,
in order to capture a greater share of the unit square market space. Its ideal state is
to push y2 to 0 therefore y2 = y1 = 0 and since it has a higher quality it would capture
the entire market. However, the producer of film 1 chooses its genre after knowing
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film 2s choice therefore if the producer of film 2 chooses y2 = 0 then the producer of
film 1 will choose y1 > 0 which leads to y1 > y2. When y1 > y2 it is the symmetric
scenario of y2 > y1, shown in Figure 1.5. There is also a similar optimal genre choice
for film 1 in this symmetric case which also suggest to keep distance with film 2, and
the profit of film 2 increases as its genre is closer to 1. Similar to when y2 > y1, now
the producer of film 2 wishes to push y2 to 1 in order to achieve y2 = y1 = 1 to capture
the entire market. Similarly, in this case if the producer of film 2 chooses y2 = 1, then
the producer of film 1 will choose y1 < 1 which will go back to the initial case with
the assumption y2 > y1. Therefore from the analysis above it is certain that if y2 is
close to 0 then the producer of film 1 will choose y2 < y1 < 1; and if y2 is close to 1
then the producer of film 1 will choose y2 > y1 > 0. Thus it can be inferred that the
optimal genre for film 2 is y2 = 1/2. If y2 = 1/2, under the assumption of y2 > y1,
the profit of film 2 will increase if y2 decrease, but if film 2 moves its genre closer to
0, then by seeing this the producer of film 1 will choose y2 < y1 < 1, which if y1 > y2
the profit of film 2 decreases if its genre is more closer to 0, therefore moving y2 closer
to 0 will lower film 2’s profit. For similar reasons, moving y2 closer to 1 will also cause
a decline in film 2’s profit. Thus, the optimal genre for film 2 is y2 = 1/2. Given
Equation 1.12, the optimal genre choice for film 1 is y1 = 1/6 when y2 > y1. Under
the assumption y1 > y2, after deriving aggregate demand functions and yielding first
order conditions from profit functions, it reaches the conclusion that when y2 = 1/2,
y1 = 5/6. It can be seen that differences in genre between film 1 and 2 in these two
cases are the same, which is 1/2− 1/6 = 5/6− 1/2 = 1/3. Thus in equilibrium these
two sets of genre choices are optimal and symmetric and both films receives the same
profit in both cases hence no one will deviate from it. So for simplicity, I will again
focus on the case y2 > y1.
Since y1 = 1/6, y2 = 1/2, the difference in genre is y2 − y1 = 1/3. By knowing
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the optimal genre choices of both films in the equilibrium, it is possible to derive the















and the quality difference is

















1.2.2.2 The Second Scenario:
y22−y21




Consider the scenario given in Figure 1.2. The aggregate demand for films 1
and 2 are
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− sp(q2 − q1)
4(y2 − y1)2
< 0. (1.28)
With Equations 1.26 and 1.28, it is obvious that when the producers of these two films
are trying to choose their genres, they face the same problem in Scenario 1 which the
producer of film 1 has an optimal solution yet the producer of film 2 prefers its genre
to be as close to 0 as possible under the assumption y2 > y1. Thus, applying the same
analysis in Scenario 1, film 2 reaches its optimal solution in the equilibrium which is
y2 = 1/2. By combining this and Equations 1.25, 1.26, and 1.27, in the equilibrium,








































In addition, the differences in quality and genre between the two films are

























1.2.3 Conclusions and Predictions from the Theoretical Model
1.2.3.1 Quality
The film makers choices on quality (budget) are discussed below.
Proposition 1. The producers of both high and low quality films will raise the quality
(budget) of their films when the expected demand of the release week increases.
Proof. In Scenario 1, according to Equations 1.18 and 1.19, which are the optimal
quality levels of the low and high quality films in the equilibrium, the optimal quality
level of both films will increase if the expected demand level s therefore expected
demand of their release week increases. In Scenario 2 Equations 1.29 and 1.30 suggest
similar conclusions.
This proposition can be explained as follows. In high demand weeks, when
there are more people willing to go to the cinema, there is more box office revenue
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to be collected. Therefore, the marginal benefit of raising the quality of the film is
high, since higher quality films will attract more consumers. So film makers of both
high and low quality films are willing to increase their budget when the demand of
the release week is expected to be high.
Proposition 2. The quality (budget) difference between the high and low quality
films released in the same week will increase if the expected demand of the release
week increases.
Proof. In Scenario 1, Equation 1.20 suggests that the higher the expected demand
level, the greater the quality difference between the high and low quality films. Equa-
tion 1.33 in Scenario 2 indicates the same.
This proposition can be explained both mathematically and intuitively. First,
since the marginal cost of quality rises slower for the high budget film, film 2, than
the low budget film (a1 > a2), which means it is less costly for film 2 to increase its
quality, the increase in quality for the high quality film is greater. According to the
functional form of θ(x), when the quality difference q2 − q1 increases, the intercept
of θ(x) will fall more closer to the horizontal axis and the absolute value of its slope
will decrease, in other words θ(x) will be more flat. Since the horizontal intercept
does not depend on q2− q1, as q2− q1 increase, θ(x) will rotate around the horizontal
intercept and become more flat, which makes the area of the unit square market space
captured by the high quality film greater, hence the market share of the low quality
film will be smaller than before. All of the above changes can be seen in Figures 1.1
and 1.2. According to Proposition 1, film makers will only improve their film quality
when the expected demand is high, which the marginal benefit of raising the budget
is high enough and when it is worthy. Thus, when expected demand of the release
week increases, the producer of the high quality film will increase its films quality
18
and budget to increase the quality difference, in order to capture more market share
from its rival.
1.2.3.2 Genre
The film makers choices on genre are discussed in this sub-section.
Proposition 3. The high quality film chooses the most popular genre of the release
week, namely, y2 = 1/2.
Proof. In both scenarios, the optimal genre choice for the high quality film in the
equilibrium is y2 = 1/2, according to Equation 1.32 and the analyses.
As mentioned above, the low quality film released in a given week will never
announce its genre and quality first since if it does the high quality film will choose
the same genre and capture the entire market with its high quality. However, this
gives the high quality film the first mover advantage, so it can choose the most pop-
ular genre in the release week. Note that the most popular genre, the one at the 1/2
point may vary across weeks. For example, the most popular genre during Valentines
Day week is romance, during summer weeks it can be action, adventure, comedy, and
so on. By choosing the most popular genre, the high quality film can capture more
than half of the market.
Proposition 4. The difference in genre between high and low budget films released
in the same week will increase if the expected demand of that week increases.
Proof. First, focus on Scenario 2. According to Equation 1.34, the difference in
genre between the two films is an increasing function in the expected market demand
level. Thus, when expected demand increases the difference in genre increases. In
Scenario 1, the genres of the two films along with the difference in genres do not
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depend on the expected demand. One condition of Scenario 1 is y22 − y21 < q2 − q1,
since in this scenario there are specific genres for both films therefore 2/9 < q2 − q1.
From Proposition 2 we know that quality differences increase as expected demand
increases, therefore when expected demand is low the quality difference between the
high and low quality films is small, thus the quality difference is likely to be smaller
than 2/9. So it is safe to conclude that in weeks expected to have low demand only
Scenario 2 will occur. In weeks with relatively high expected demand, both scenarios
are possible, and since the difference in genre in Scenario 1 is already quite large, the
conclusion that as the expected demand increases the difference in genre between the
two films increases can be reached.
Since the high budget film decides its genre first and chooses y2 = 1/2, then
the low quality film makes its decision accordingly, the difference in genre depends
greatly on the choice of the low quality film, film 1. From the functional form of θ(x)
and Figures 1.1 and 1.2, it can be seen that if the difference in genre increases, the
intercept of θ(x) will rise more farther away from the horizontal axis. The absolute
value of its slope will increase making θ(x) steeper, and the horizontal intercept will
move closer to the vertical axis. By doing this, the low quality film is trying to capture
more market share from its high quality rival. From Proposition 2, it is clear that
when expected demand is high, the high quality film attracts consumers from the low
quality one by increasing the quality difference. The low quality film, however, due
to its high increase rate in marginal cost a1, has difficulty competing with its rival on
quality. Therefore, in high demand weeks, the low quality film compensates for its
disadvantage in quality by moving its genre closer to one end, in order to capture the
consumers whose desired genre is located around that end which is far away from the
high quality films genre, although doing this might cause the low quality film to lose
some consumers whose most preferred genre is between the genres of the two films
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even with low quality valuation. It makes no sense for the low quality film to have a
genre closer to its rival, for if it does not only it is still likely to lose the consumers with
preferred genre between them due to the increasing difference in quality, but the low
quality film will also lose the consumers located around the closer end for its genre is
farther away from their preferred genre and the increasing difference in quality. Thus,
I conclude that as the expected demand of the release week increases, the difference
in genre between the high and low quality film released that week increases.
1.3 Data and Variables
For this study I collected data from Box Office Mojo, IMDb and IMDbPro.
Box Office Mojo provides release dates of all wide releases and number of tickets
sold each week. I only focus on wide releases for they are responsible for most of
the box office revenue each week. IMDb and IMDbPro provide detailed information
for each movie, such as production budget, genre, producer, distributor and so on.
The dataset includes data of wide releases from January 2007 to December 2016, and
ticket sales numbers from January 1997 to December 2016.
In the empirical study, in order to test the predictions from the theoretical
model, I have conducted several tests with different dependent variables, namely
Budget, MaxBudget, MinBudget, AvgBudget, BudgetDiff and GenSim. Budget
is the estimated budget of each film, which is used as a proxy for the ax-ante quality
of the film, and it can be seen in Table 1.1, during the sample period, the average
budget of all wide releases is around 50 million dollars, and there is a lot of variation
across all films. MaxBudget, MinBudget, AvgBudget are the maximum, minimum
and average budgets of the films released in a certain week, respectively. In order to
compare the budgets and genres of films, I pair the films that are released in the same
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week into film pairs. BudgetDiff is the absolute value of the budget difference of
each film pair. To compare the genres of the films, I create a variable GenSim, which
is genre similarity. IMDb gives at most three keywords to describe a films genre, and
I compare them. For instance, if two films both have three keywords, and there is
only one match, then GenSim would be 33%. If one film has three keywords and the
other has one, and it matches one of the three, GenSim would be 33%.8
It is important to recognize that the theoretical model only examines the
relationship between the highest and other low quality (budget) films of the week,
and omits the interactions between low quality films.9 However, the films pairs are
pairs of all films, including pairs between highest and low budget films and also only
between low budget films. Therefore in order to test the predictions more precisely, I
have separated the film pairs into two groups. The first group includes the film pairs
with the highest budget film of the week, the second group only contains film pairs
of the low budget films. For example, if there are three films released in a certain
week, films A, B and C, film A with the highest budget, then film pairs AB and AC
would be in group 1, and film pair BC would be in group 2. The film pairs in group
1 represent the relationship of the films in the theoretical model. Table 1.3 shows
that budget differences between films released in the same week, especially between
highest budget and low budget films, are big. Also, genre similarities between high
budget and low budget films seems to be low, comparing with the similarity among
low budget films.
8This method of measuring genre similarity is inspired by Berry and Waldfogel (1999) and Berry
and Waldfogel (2001).
9Due to the duopoly setting of the model.
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1.3.1 Independent Variables
Sequel is a dummy variable indicating whether this film is a sequel. Normally,
a producer will only produce a sequel if the original film was a financial success, thus
producers should have more confidence in it thus a large budget can be expected.
Also, since the first film is a success, this will make the sequel have a built-in positive
reputation before it is released, which makes it more popular among consumers and
more difficult for other films to compete against. Table 1.2 shows that 13% of the
films in the dataset are sequel films. SP is a dummy variable indicating if this film is
a studio production or not.10 Studios, especially the largest six, have great financial
advantages, thus their productions are likely to have larger budgets, which is shown
in Table 1.1. And according to Table 1.2, 80% of the films are studio productions.
These two variables both have signigicant effect on production budget, therefore are
included to make sure the estimation is accurate.
ExpDemand is the expected demand of the release week, it is the main in-
dependent variable in the empirical tests, which theory predicts that if the expected
demand increases, the quality (budget) of films, quality (budget) difference and dif-
ference in genre of films will all increase. I use weekly ticket sales as a proxy for
weekly demand of films. ExpDemand is the average of number of tickets sold in a
certain week in the past ten years. For example, the expected demand for the 5th
week in 2015 is the average of number of tickets sold in the 5th weeks from 2005 to
2014. Studios consider the opening week as the most important week, for the box
office revenue each film receive in this week is responsible for 30%-40% of its total box
office revenue, which is also usually the highest weekly revenue.11 Thus the expected
demand of the first week should be the most important factor that affects the choices
10If not, it is an independent film.
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of films. Table 1.2 suggests that on average 24 million people are expected to go see a
movie each week, however, there is also a lot of variation, which means the expected
and actual demand vary greatly across weeks.
ExpDemandn2 is the average expected demand of the two weeks after the
release week, or the expected demand of the next two weeks. It is the average number
of tickets sold in the next two weeks in the past ten years. A film can still be very
popular in its second and third week, so the expected demand of the next two weeks
may also have an impact. The average of the expected demand of the next two weeks
is also around 24 million, but with a smaller variation.
An alternative measure of expected demand is to use the actual demand of
that week, assuming that studios are very good at demand prediction which they can
predict the actual ticket numbers. Demand is the actual demand of the release week,
it is the actual number of tickets sold that week. The average is around 23 million
but with much higher variance comparing to ExpDemand which is reasonable since
ExpDemand is an average value across ten years. Demandn2 is the average demand
of the two weeks after the release week. It is the average number of tickets sold in
the next two weeks.
SequelComp is an indicator which equals 1 if there is a sequel film in a film
pair. As I mentioned above, sequels are likely to have high budgets and are hard
to compete against due to their built-in reputation and popularity, thus the budget
difference between a sequel film and a non-sequel film is expected to be large, and for
other films intend to avoid direct competition with sequel films, the genre similarity
between them is likely to be low. Only 13% of the films are sequels and there are
a total of 1550 films in the dataset, which means there are around 200 sequel films
over the ten years thus there are on average 20 sequel films each year across 52 weeks,
11According to weekly box office revenue data of all wide releases in the U.S. from 2007-2016.
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therefore it is very unlikely that there will be two sequel films released in the same
week, at least this did not appear in the dataset. In addition, year fixed-effects (Y ear)
are included in all regressions.
1.3.2 Instrumental Variables
The theoretical model predicts that expected demand of the release week has
a great impact on quality (budget) and genre choices of a film. However, in real-
ity, it is likely that a film with high budget and/or popular genre will attract more
audience thus resulting a high number in ticket sales, so there may be an endogene-
ity problem and the variables ExpDemand, ExpDemandn2 and their alternatives
Demand, Demandn2 might be endogenous variables.12 Therefore instrumental vari-
ables are needed in order to correct this. From Figure 1.1 it is clear that demand
for films are very different across weeks, and the weeks with high demand are usually
the weeks that have public holidays, such as Valentines Day, Easter, Memorial Day,
Independence Day, summer break, Labor Day, Thanksgiving and Christmas.13 A
common feature of these weeks is that people have more leisure time, which makes
the marginal cost of seeing a film much lower, thus the demand for films are high dur-
ing these weeks. So, I use indicators of these public holidays as instrumental variables
for expected demand in order to correct for endogeneity.
12Einav (2007) reveals gross seasonality is amplified by the films’ release decisions, which demon-
strates the endogeneity of observed seasonal patterns in total box office revenues, and implies ex-
pected and actual weekly demand are endogenous.
13Although Valentines Day is not a public holiday, it still attracts people to cinemas and the
demand for films is high in those weeks, so it is included; summer break can also boost demand,
and most universities in the U.S. have summer breaks starting in May and ending in August, public
schools also have summer break around that time frame. New Year is dropped since there were no
films released during New Year’s week for several years in the dataset.
25
Tables 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 include summary statistics of all important variables.
1.4 Empirical Strategy
1.4.1 Specifications
The empirical analysis aims to examine the predictions from the theoretical
model presented above. Note that since quality is hard to quantify, budget will be
used as a proxy for it. Theory suggests that when weekly expected demand increases,
the budgets (quality) of both the high quality film and the low quality film released
that week will increase. High quality film refers to the film with the highest budget
released in a week, and low quality films are the other films released that week,
following the same categorization as the theoretical model. Also, as weekly expected
demand increase, the budget (quality) difference and the difference in genres between
these two films are predicted to increase. It is worth mentioning while the predictions
from the theoretical model apply to a duopoly model of two films, my empirical results
still confirm these predictions although there are usually more than two films each
week in my dataset.
To test these hypotheses, I conduct several regressions to examine the effect
of weekly expected demand. The first regression is to estimate the average effect of
weekly expected demand on budgets of all films
ln(Budgetjt) = α + β1ln(ExpDemandt) + β2ln(ExpDemandn2t)
+β3Sequeljt + β4SPjt + β5Y eart + εjt,
(1.35)
where Budgetjt is the budget in dollars for film j released in week t, which is used
as a proxy for the quality of film j, ExpDemandt is the expected demand of week t,
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ExpDemandn2t is the average of expected demand of the next two weeks (the two
weeks after week t), Sequeljt is an indicator for whether film j released in week t is a
sequel film, and SPjt is an indicator for whether film jreleased in week t is a studio
production. Year fixed effects Y eart is included. Since the purpose is to examine the
effect of expected demand, β1 is the coefficient of interest.
The specification above is clearly not enough to support the predictions since
it only estimates an average effect of expected demand on all films. In order to
make the estimates more precise, and since the theoretical model focus on the highest
quality film and the other film with a relatively low quality, I conduct the following
regressions which estimate the effect of weekly expected demand on the budgets of
the highest and lowest budget films released in a given week, and also the average
budget of the week
ln(MaxBudgett) = α + β1ln(ExpDemandt) + β2ln(ExpDemandn2t)
+β3Y eart + εt,
(1.36)
where MaxBudgett is the highest film budget among all the films released in week
t, which can be replaced by MinBudgett, the lowest film budget among all the films
released in week t, and AvgBudgett, the average budget of the films released in week
t, in order to examine the effect expected demand on lowest and average budget of
the week, respectively. β1 is the coefficient of interest for all these three regressions.
The above specifications are constructed to empirically test Proposition 1.
The following regressions are designed to examine the effect of expected de-
mand on difference in budget and genre between two films released in the same week
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which is to test Propositions 2 and 4 empirically
ln(BudgetDiffjkt) = α + β1ln(ExpDemandt) + β2ln(ExpDemandn2t)
+β3SequelCompjkt + β5Y eart + εjkt
(1.37)
where BudgetDiffjkt is the budget difference between films j and k which are re-
leased in week t, SequelCompjkt is an indicator for whether there is a sequel film
between films j and k which are released in week t. BudgetDiffjkt can be replaced
by GenSimjkt, which is genre similarity between films j and k which are released in
week t, in order to estimate the effect of expected demand on genre similarity. As
mentioned above, I separated all of the film pairs into two groups, one includes the
film pairs with the highest budget film of the week, and the other contains only film
pairs between low budget films. The film pairs in the former group represent the
relationship between the films in the theoretical model, thus estimations using these
film pairs should be used to test the hypotheses. However, regressions applying the
film pairs in the other group can reveal how the budget and genre differences between
low budget films will change as expected demand alters, which the theoretical model
omits, therefore makes this study more comprehensive. β1 is the coefficient of interest
for all these regressions.
For all of the above regressions, an alternative approach is to replace ExpDemandt
and ExpDemandn2t with Demandt and Demandn2t, which are actual demand in
week t and the average of actual demand of the next two weeks, respectively. These
specifications with Demandt and Demandn2t can be used to complement all the
above regressions and can also serve as robustness checks.
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1.4.2 Heteroscedasticity, Endogeneity, and Other Issues
The purpose of the empirical work of this paper is to identify the effect of
weekly expected demand on the budget of films released that week, and also on dif-
ference in budget and genre between films released that week. So the expected demand
variables should only describe the effect of expected demand instead of unexpected
things, especially incorrect information. One possible issue that might need to be
aware of is heteroscedasticity, since the variances of MaxBudgett and MinBudgett,
BudgetDiffjkt and GenSimjkt of film pairs in different groups are very different. In
order to correct this problem and acquire more precise estimates, I will use robust
standard errors for the OLS regressions and also FGLS regressions.
As mentioned in the previous section, ExpDemandt and ExpDemandn2t,
along with their alternatives Demandt and Demandn2t, are likely to be endogenous.
Thus I will also apply 2SLS with the instrumental variables mentioned above to
correct for endogeneity in expected demand.14 Therefore each specification will be
estimated by three methods, OLS with robust standard errors, FGLS and 2SLS.
Another issue is that the measurement for genre similarity. Genre similarity
of two films is acquired by comparing the keywords for genre given by IMDb. Since
this genre similarity is poorly measured, the estimation results regarding genre sim-
ilarity between films are less precise. While this is a limitation of the data which I
acknowledge, the genre measure does not introduce any known bias into the results.
Finally, I include year fixed effects in all regressions to concentrate the esti-
mations on the impact of expected demand by week.
14Robust standard errors are also used here.
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1.5 Results
1.5.1 Average Effect of Expected Demand on Film Budget
Table 1.4 presents results for the specification in Equation 1.35. The regres-
sions in the first three columns use ExpDemandt, the average weekly number of
tickets sold in the previous ten years to measure the expected demand of the films re-
lease week and the average expected demand of the next two weeks, ExpDemandn2t,
while the results in the last three columns are estimated by the alternative approach
which uses Demandt, the actual weekly number of tickets sold in each week to mea-
sure the expected demand of the films release week and the average expected demand
of the next two weeks, Demandn2t. Regressions in columns 1 and 4 use OLS with
robust standard errors reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Regressions in
columns 2 and 5 use FGLS in order to correct for heteroscedasticity. Regressions in
columns 3 and 6 use 2SLS in order to correct for endogeneity in expected demand
variables, with robust standard errors reported in the parentheses. The format of
the following tables presenting estimation results are similar to the first. First stage
estimation results and the coefficient estimates for the year fixed effect variables are
reported in the Appendix.
The results in Table 1.4 show that when the expected demand of the release
week is relatively high, the film budgets increase. The OLS results in column 1
suggest that on average film budgets will increase by 0.66% if the expected demand
of the release week is 1% higher. Since films are exhibited in cinemas more than
one week, thus film producers are also concerned about the following weeks. The
expected demand of the next two weeks has a much smaller impact, a 1% increase
will only encourage the film budgets to rise 0.28% on average. As one may expect,
sequel films and studio productions are much more likely to have larger budgets than
30
non-sequel films and independent films, respectively. On average, the film budget
of a sequel film is 73.24% higher than a non-sequel film, and the budget of a studio
production is 90.40% higher than an independent film. The above percentage impacts
of expected demand can be converted into amounts. According to Table 1.2, the
average film budget of all wide releases from 2007 to 2016 is $49,860,380, and the
average expected demand is 23,900,387, which is the average number of tickets sold.
Thus, if the expected demand of a week increases by 239,004, which is 1% on average,
the films released in that week on average will increase their budget by roughly
$329,079.
FGLS estimation gives very similar results in both coefficients and standard
errors, as shown in column 2, with a 0.66% increase in film budget if the expected
demand of the release week increased by 1%. Column 3 presents the results of 2SLS,
the expected demand variable seems to have absorbed some of the effect of the ex-
pected demand of the next two weeks through the instrumental variables, which the
coefficient of ExpDemandt increasing from 0.66 to 0.69, suggesting that on average
the film producers care more about the expected demand of the release week than of
future weeks. This makes sense, since the highest weekly box office revenue of a film
is usually generated in the release week, and it accounts for 30-40% of the overall box
office revenue. The estimation results of Sequeljt and SPjt are similar with previous
estimations.
Columns 4, 5 and 6 in Table 1.4 present the estimation results from the alter-
native approach by using the alternative expected demand variables Demandt and
Demandn2t, which complement the results above. However, the 2SLS estimation re-
sults in column 6 shows a different result from the OLS and FGLS estimates. In this
estimation the expected demand variable did not absorb the effect of the expected
demand of the next two weeks, though the results are similar with the OLS and FGLS
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results and expected demand of the next two weeks still has impact on film budgets.
All the above findings support the prediction that if the expected demand of a week
increases, the budget (quality) of the films released that week will increase.
1.5.2 Effect of Expected Demand on Highest, Lowest and
Average Budget of Films Released in the Same Week
Figure 1.7 shows the relationship between weekly expected demand and weekly
average film budget in 2008, which is similar across all years in the sample period.
The horizontal axis is weeks sorted from the smallest to the largest by weekly ex-
pected demand. The left vertical axis corresponds with weekly expected demand
(in million tickets), and the right vertical axis is the weekly average film budget (in
million dollars). It is clear that expected demand is monotonically increasing, and
the figure shows that the linear trend of weekly average budget is also upward slop-
ing, implying that on average the weekly average budget is increasing as the weekly
expected demand increases.
Table 1.5 presents results for the specification in Equation 1.36. The findings
show that when the expected demand of the release week increases, the budget of
the highest budget film of the week will also increase. The high quality film in the
theoretical model is clearly the film with the highest budget of the week here. The
2SLS results in column 3 suggest that if the expected demand in a week increases
by 1%, the highest film budget of that week shall be 1.11% higher. The expected
demand of the next two weeks again has a smaller impact, where a 1% increase will
lead to a 0.46% increase in the highest budget. The OLS and FGLS estimations show
similar results in columns 1 and 2, and columns 4, 5 and 6 suggest that the alternative
approach using actual ex-post demand also yield similar estimation results. These
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findings support the prediction which the budget (quality) of the high quality film
will increase if the expected demand of the release week increases.
The same specification can be used to examine the effect of expected demand
on the lowest or average budgets of the films released in the same week, by replacing
MaxBudgett with MinBudgett and AvgBudgett. The low quality film in the theo-
retical model can be any film other than the highest budget film here, thus examining
the effect of expected demand on the lowest and average budget of the week can help
to reveal how these films set their budgets. Table 1.6 shows the impact of expected
demand on the lowest film budget of the week as predicted, it increases as the ex-
pected demand increases. The 2SLS results in column 3 suggest that the lowest film
budget of the week will increase by 0.89% when the expected demand of the week has
a 1% increase. A 1% increase in expected demand of the next two weeks will lead to
a 0.67% increase in the lowest budget. The estimation results in the other columns
are similar.
Table 1.7 indicates that the average budget of a week increases as the expected
demand increases. Tables 1.5 and 1.6 has shown expected demand has a positive
impact on the highest and lowest film budget of a week, it is necessary to check if
the budgets of the films other than the highest and lowest budget films increase as
expected demand rises, which any of these films can be also considered as the low
quality film in the theoretical model, and average budget includes budget information
of these films. Column 3 reports coefficient estimates by using 2SLS, and they show
a 1% increase in expected demand in that week can result in a 0.92% rise in average
budget of the films released that week. The impact of the expected demand of the next
two weeks has a smaller impact, the same increase can only lead to a 0.67% increase
in average budget. The other columns show similar results. These findings in Tables
1.6 and 1.7 both support the prediction that the low budget (quality) films will also
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increase their budgets when the expected demand of the release week increase.
1.5.3 Effect of Expected Demand on Budget Differences and
Genre Similarities Between Highest Budget and Low
Budget Films Released in the Same Week
Table 1.8 presents estimation results for the specification in Equation 1.37
using film pairs with the highest budget film of the week. The results show that the
budget difference between high and low budget films which are released in the same
week will increase when the expected demand of the release week increases. The 2SLS
results suggest that on average the budget difference will increase by 0.83% when the
expected demand of the week sees a 1% increase. A 1% increase in the expected
demand of the next two weeks will cause a 1.08% increase in budget difference. Film
producers of high budget films clearly care about both release week revenues and
future week revenues. Furthermore, if there is a sequel film among the two films,
then the budget difference between them will be 35.97% higher compared to a pair of
non-sequel films. Budgets of sequel films are on average 73% higher than non-sequel
films. The results of OLS and FGLS estimations reported in columns 1 and 2 show
that the impact of expected demand is smaller than the 2SLS estimation results,
which the coefficient dropped to 0.56. The regression results of using actual demand
instead of a ten year average are reported in columns 4, 5 and 6. Unlike the results
in the first three columns, the coefficients of expected demand of the release week
are rather stable, but the 2SLS estimated coefficient for expected demand of the next
two weeks is larger than the coefficients estimated by OLS and FGLS. The findings
in Table 1.8 support the prediction that as weekly expected demand increases, the
budget (quality) difference between high and low quality films released that week will
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increase.
Figure 1.8 presents the relationship between weekly expected demand and
genre similarities between high budget and low budget films released in the same
week in 2008, which is similar across all years in the sample period. The axes are
defined as in Figure 1.7, except that the right vertical axis is the genre similarity
between high budget and low budget films in percentage terms. The figure shows
that the expected demand is monotonically increasing since the weeks are sorted and
the linear trend of genre similarities is downward sloping, implying genre similarity
between high budget and low budget films is declining as expected demand of the
release week increases.
The specification in Equation 1.37 can be used to demonstrate the effect of ex-
pected demand on genre similarity by replacing the dependent variableBudgetDiffjkt
with GenSimjkt. The results are reported in Table 1.9, which suggest that an increase
in a weeks expected demand will result in a decrease in genre similarity between high
and low budget films released that week. The 2SLS estimation results indicate that
when expected demand increases by 1% the genre similarity of the two films released
that week will fall by 10.31 percentage points, with the measure of genre similarity
taking a value between 0 and 100%. The results of the OLS and FGLS estimations
in Columns 1 and 2 and the alternative approach estimation results in Columns 4, 5
and 6 all show similar results, although there are some differences in the coefficients,
the impact of expected demand on genre similarity is still relative large. In addi-
tion, if there is a sequel film among the two films, the genre similarity between them
will be 5.44% lower compared to a pair of non-sequel films. This is reasonable since
sequel films are only produced if the first film was a financial success, which means
the sequel shall have a positive built-in reputation that makes it more popular and
harder to compete against thus other films would rather choose a different genre to
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avoid direct competition with these sequel films. The results in Table 1.9 support
the prediction that an increase in a weeks expected demand will lead to a decrease
in genre similarities between the high and low quality films released that week.
A few things need to be clarified regarding the results in Table 1.9. First, the
estimated effects of expected demand on genre similarity are only significant at the
90% confidence level. This is due to limitations in the measurement of genre and
genre similarity, with genre defined by at most three keywords given by IMDb, and
genre similarities determined by comparing these keywords to see if there are any
matches. While I acknowledge this limitation, I would expect more refined data to
be more precise, but not to alter the results in any significant way. Another thing
is the estimation results in the first three columns suggest the expected demand of
the next two weeks has a positive impact on genre similarity, while the estimation
results of the alternative approach reported in the last three columns indicate expected
demand of the next two week has no significant impact. The results are uncertain
when predicting the effect of future expected demand on genre similarity, yet if it does
have a positive effect, one possible explanation is that the high budget film released
in week 1, which can be called film A, expects a film with even higher budget to be
released in the following weeks if the expected demand is going to be high for the
next two weeks, thus film A would want to choose a different genre instead of a more
popular genre that the future film would choose in order to avoid direct competition.
However, this might cause film A to have a more similar genre to the low budget films
also released in week 1. More evidence is needed to solve this issue, yet it does not
have a great impact on the analysis nor the results, since expected demand of the
release week is the independent variable of interest.
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1.5.4 Effect of Expected Demand on Budget Differences and
Genre Similarities Between Low Budget Films Released
in the Same Week
As mentioned before, the theoretical model only focus on the relationship
between the high quality film and low quality films released in the same week. The
interactions between these low quality (budget) films have been omitted. In this
sub-section, I examine the interactions of the low budget films empirically. Table
1.10 reports estimation results for the specification in Equation 1.37 using film pairs
without the highest budget films of each week, i.e. only with the low budget films.
The results suggest the budget difference between low budget films released in the
same week increases with the expected demand of that week. The 2SLS estimation
results in Column 3 show that the budget difference increases by 1.31% when the
expected demand sees a 1% raise. Even among low budget films, the producers of the
ones with relatively higher budgets will try to dominate the others with greater budget
differences by increasing their budgets more. However, the expected demand of the
next two weeks has no significant impact on the budget difference. One possible
explanation is that the low budget films are generally expected to be exhibited in
cinemas for a shorter time compared with the high budgets films, thus future expected
demand has less impact. Whether there is a sequel film among two low budget films
does not have a significant effect on their budget difference, since the number of sequel
films among low budget films is very low. Also, low budget films are likely to have
low budget sequels, if any.15 The budget levels tend to be consistent across films in a
film series. The OLS and FGLS estimations along with estimations by the alternative
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approach all yield similar results which are reported in the other columns.
Again the specification in Equation 1.37 can be used to test the effect of ex-
pected demand on genre similarity by replacing the dependent variableBudgetDiffjkt
with GenSimjkt. The results are presented in Table 1.11 which indicate that an
increase in a weeks expected demand will result in an increase in genre similarity
between the low budget films released that week. According to the 2SLS estimation
results reported in Column 3, a 1% increase in expected demand will cause a 15.43
percentage points increase in genre similarity. The reason behind this is when ex-
pected demand is high, according to results in previous tables, it is likely that the
budget of the high budget film this week is also going to be very high and the budget
difference between this high budget film and low budget films will be even greater,
thus these low budget films will have to choose genres that are much more different
than the popular genres which high budget films are likely to choose in order to com-
pensate the great disadvantage in budgets. In this case, however, there are limited
genre options left for these low budget films therefore the genre similarities between
these films will be greater if the expected demand increases. Again, the expected
demand of the next two weeks has no significant impact, possibly due to the same
reasons mentioned in Table 1.10. Finally, if there is a sequel film among the two films,
the genre similarity between them will be 10.71 percentage points lower comparing
with a pair of non-sequel films. The OLS, FGLS estimations and the estimations by
the alternative approach all show similar results. Therefore this sub-section provides
empirical evidence that when expected demand in a week increases, the budget dif-
ferences and genre similarities between the low budget films released that week are
both going to increase.
15If low budget films have sequels, then the sequels are likely to have low budget too. For example,
low budget film series such as Paranormal Activities, Tyler Perry Films and so on.
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1.6 Conclusion
This paper provides both theoretical and empirical findings of competition
with horizontal and vertical differentiation but without price variation, which was
overlooked in previous literature. The theoretical model indicates that, assuming
only two films are released each week (a high quality film and a low quality film),
if the expected demand of the release week increases, the quality of both films will
increase. Furthermore, the difference in quality and genre between the two films
will also increase. The empirical findings from the U.S. film industry confirm the
predictions from the theoretical model. The empirical results show that expected
demand of the release week has a positive effect on film budgets, which is used as a
proxy for quality, of both high and low quality films. The difference in budget and
genre between high and low quality films will also increase if the expected demand
increases.
I contribute to the literature by presenting a duopoly model which is able
to analyze competition between firms and reveal their quality and variety choices in
the absence of price competition. Both theoretical and empirical findings on quality
(budget) are consistent with the literature’s predictions, but the findings on genre
choices are new and surprising. In particular, they differ from the conclusions in
existing literature on duopoly competition since the pricing schemes are different and
genre choices are not thoroughly discussed in articles focusing on the film industry.
My analysis, and its results, are applicable to other industries with similar
characteristics, such as video game software industry. For example, PlayStation 4
games all have the same release price of $59.99, and these games have different variety
(genre) such as sports, action, adventure, role-playing, and so on, as well as different
ex-ante qualities.16 Also, higher quality games are expected to be released during
39
holidays and breaks when there are a lot of gifts being exchanged and people have
more leisure time. Therefore, the application of this model in other industries is
possible, and similar results can be anticipated.
There exist, however, several limitations in extending the applications of my
model. First, a duopoly model was applied in the theoretical analysis, when in reality,
as shown in the empirical study, there are usually more than two films released in
a week. Although the duopoly assumption does not introduce any known bias into
this study, a more generalized model that allows more parties instead of only two
will certainly improve the accuracy. Also, genre and genre similarity are poorly
measured, therefore an improved way of defining genre empirically can also improve
the accuracy of estimation results. These limitations provide research opportunities
for future studies.
16Only the regular edition, deluxe editions have higher prices.
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1.7 Figures and Tables
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Figure 1.5: Assuming y1 > y2
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Figure 1.6: Weekly Ticket Sales in 2007
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Figure 1.7: Weekly Expected Demand and Average Budget in 2008
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Figure 1.8: Weekly Expected Demand and Genre Similarity in 2008
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics of Film Makers
Avg. No. of Films per Year Max Budget Min Budget Average Film Budget
Walt Disney 16.6 300m 5m 96.62m
Sony 16.8 258m 2m 54.46m
WB 19.8 250m 0.1m 68.90m
Fox 16.6 237m 6m 59.11m
Paramount 12.6 210m 3m 75.15m
Universal 18 209m 1m 50.91m
Lionsgate 10.1 160m 2.5m 38.06m
Independent 32.1 102m 0.01m 22.94m
Table 1.2: Summary Statistics for all Films and Weeks 2007-2016
Variables Observations Mean S.D. Min Max
All Films
Budget 1550 49,860,380 51,841,550 10,000 300,000,000
Sequel 1550 0.13 0.33 0 1
SP 1550 0.79 0.40 0 1
All Weeks
MaxBudget 516 94,905,800 61,684,310 5,000,000 300,000,000
MinBudget 516 30,334,850 44,801,810 10,000 250,000,000
AvgBudget 516 58,455,880 45,301,830 4,250,000 250,000,000
ExpDemand 516 23,900,387 7,620,961 11,464,910 43,766,950
ExpDemandn2 516 23,934,847 7,186,968 12,175,540 42,065,455
Demand 516 23,269,698 9,072,785 8,400,000 63,792,300
Demandn2 516 23,282,194 7,957,389 10,170,650 57,312,900
Table 1.3: Summary Statistics for Film Pairs 2007-2016
Variables Observations Mean S.D.
All Film Pairs
BudgetDiff 1941 40,831,750 45,366,830
GenSim 1941 0.22 0.27
With Highest Budget Film of the Week
BudgetDiff 1034 59,755,180 51,997,430
GenSim 1034 0.18 0.23
Without Highest Budget Film of the Week
BudgetDiff 907 19,258,620 21,207,110
GenSim 907 0.25 0.30
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Table 1.4: All Films
ln(Budget) OLS Robust S.E. FGLS 2SLS OLS Robust S.E. FGLS 2SLS
ln(ExpDemand) 0.6630*** 0.6589*** 0.6935***
(0.1192) (0.1207) (0.1589)
ln(ExpDemandn2) 0.2847** 0.2846** 0.2494
(0.1312) (0.1314) (0.1629)
ln(Demand) 0.6143*** 0.6140*** 0.6232***
(0.0779) (0.0872) (0.1151)
ln(Demandn2) 0.2615*** 0.2590*** 0.3042**
(0.0909) (0.0984) (0.1210)
Sequel 0.7324*** 0.7371*** 0.7329*** 0.7121*** 0.7186*** 0.7058***
(0.0782) (0.0862) (0.0781) (0.0775) (0.0862) (0.0773)
SP 0.9040*** 0.9072*** 0.9031*** 0.8926*** 0.8972*** 0.8894***
(0.0872) (0.0715) (0.0875) (0.0872) (0.0716) (0.0877)
N 1550 1550 1550 1550 1550 1550
R2 0.2246 0.2266 0.2246 0.2267 0.2292 0.2266
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
50
Table 1.5: Weekly Results: Maximum Budget
ln(MaxBudget) OLS Robust S.E. FGLS 2SLS OLS Robust S.E. FGLS 2SLS
ln(ExpDemand) 0.8702*** 0.8609*** 1.1113***
(0.1332) (0.1227) (0.1519)
ln(ExpDemandn2) 0.5652*** 0.5716*** 0.4564***
(0.1380) (0.1297) (0.1520)
ln(Demand) 0.9630*** 0.9548*** 1.0106***
(0.0842) (0.0812) (0.1140)
ln(Demandn2) 0.4122*** 0.4165*** 0.5442***
(0.0908) (0.0913) (0.1159)
N 516 516 516 516 516 516
R2 0.2951 0.2964 0.2891 0.3471 0.3478 0.3419
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 1.6: Weekly Results: Minimum Budget
ln(MinBudget) OLS Robust S.E. FGLS 2SLS OLS Robust S.E. FGLS 2SLS
ln(ExpDemand) 0.9436*** 0.9302*** 0.8894**
(0.2988) (0.2785) (0.3932)
ln(ExpDemandn2) 0.6256** 0.6301** 0.6683*
(0.3043) (0.2938) (0.3749)
ln(Demand) 0.9554*** 0.9505*** 0.8969***
(0.1831) (0.1910) (0.2672)
ln(Demandn2) 0.4537** 0.4521** 0.6306**
(0.1950) (0.2144) (0.2587)
N 516 516 516 516 516 516
R2 0.1066 0.1063 0.1065 0.1083 0.1083 0.1071
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.7: Weekly Results: Average Budget
ln(AvgBudget) OLS Robust S.E. FGLS 2SLS OLS Robust S.E. FGLS 2SLS
ln(ExpDemand) 0.7734*** 0.7595*** 0.9201***
(0.1258) (0.1189) (0.1475)
ln(ExpDemandn2) 0.7026*** 0.7103*** 0.6644***
(0.1358) (0.1256) (0.1499)
ln(Demand) 0.9228*** 0.9131*** 0.8873***
(0.0865) (0.0791) (0.1099)
ln(Demandn2) 0.4771*** 0.4797*** 0.6777***
(0.0900) (0.0889) (0.1108)
N 516 516 516 516 516 516
R2 0.3234 0.3237 0.3207 0.3667 0.3662 0.3598
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.8: Film Pairs with Highest Budget Film of the Week: Budget Difference
ln(BudgetDiff) OLS Robust S.E. FGLS 2SLS OLS Robust S.E. FGLS 2SLS
ln(ExpDemand) 0.5607** 0.5646** 0.8311**
(0.2862) (0.3081) (0.3962)
ln(ExpDemandn2) 1.0775*** 1.0798*** 1.0769***
(0.3384) (0.3413) (0.4031)
ln(Demand) 0.7311*** 0.7280*** 0.7664**
(0.1665) (0.2260) (0.3266)
ln(Demandn2) 0.8746*** 0.8797*** 1.0764***
(0.2218) (0.2582) (0.3127)
SequelComp 0.4029*** 0.3946** 0.3597** 0.3639** 0.3571** 0.3340**
(0.1454) (0.1757) (0.1461) (0.1468) (0.1764) (0.1413)
N 1034 1034 1034 1034 1034 1034
R2 0.0548 0.0553 0.0536 0.0589 0.0595 0.0581
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 1.9: Film Pairs with Highest Budget Film of the Week: Genre Similarity
GenSim OLS Robust S.E. FGLS 2SLS OLS Robust S.E. FGLS 2SLS
ln(ExpDemand) -0.0796* -0.0781* -0.1031*
(0.0426) (0.0423) (0.0559)
ln(ExpDemandn2) 0.0800* 0.0806* 0.1097*
(0.0481) (0.0470) (0.0602)
ln(Demand) -0.0605* -0.0582* -0.0721*
(0.0323) (0.0311) (0.0430)
ln(Demandn2) 0.0396 0.0389 0.0712
(0.0366) (0.0357) (0.0458)
SequelComp -0.0546** -0.0551** -0.0544** -0.0489** -0.0491** -0.0498**
(0.0235) (0.0242) (0.0236) (0.0236) (0.0243) (0.0241)
N 1034 1034 1034 1034 1034 1034
R2 0.0191 0.0195 0.0187 0.0190 0.0183
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.10: Film Pairs without Highest Budget Film of the Week: Budget Difference
ln(BudgetDiff) OLS Robust S.E. FGLS 2SLS OLS Robust S.E. FGLS 2SLS
ln(ExpDemand) 1.0896*** 1.0907*** 1.3118***
(0.3649) (0.3942) (0.4040)
ln(ExpDemandn2) 0.4553 0.4527 0.0262
(0.4176) (0.5014) (0.4624)
ln(Demand) 1.1080*** 1.1076*** 1.0788***
(0.2785) (0.2936) (0.3243)
ln(Demandn2) -0.0300 -0.0347 0.1919
(0.3599) (0.3908) (0.3957)
SequelComp 0.2554 0.2587 0.2724 0.2476 0.2503 0.2409
(0.3197) (0.3447) (0.3200) (0.3191) (0.3441) (0.3176)
N 907 907 907 907 907 907
R2 0.0366 0.0369 0.0358 0.0362 0.0364 0.0358
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 1.11: Film Pairs without Highest Budget Film of the Week: Genre Similarity
GenSim OLS Robust S.E. FGLS 2SLS OLS Robust S.E. FGLS 2SLS
ln(ExpDemand) 0.1384*** 0.1379*** 0.1543***
(0.0478) (0.0460) (0.0771)
ln(ExpDemandn2) -0.0558 -0.0564 -0.0526
(0.0612) (0.0589) (0.0771)
ln(Demand) 0.1090*** 0.1121*** 0.1267***
(0.0351) (0.0343) (0.0445)
ln(Demandn2) -0.0537 -0.0530 -0.0794
(0.0469) (0.0462) (0.0603)
SequelComp -0.1064*** -0.1044*** -0.1071*** -0.1099*** -0.1091*** -0.1100***
(0.0395) (0.0406) (0.0391) (0.0400) (0.0404) (0.0398)
N 907 907 907 907 907 907
R2 0.0418 0.0411 0.0415 0.0419 0.0420 0.0414
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Chapter 2
Film Release Date Competition
and the Effect of Vertical Structure
2.1 Introduction
Many articles regarding vertical structure and incomplete contract were devel-
oped in the past three or four decades. Generally, these papers have given thorough
discussions regarding the nature of the firm, starting from Coase (1937). These liter-
ature can be seen as two different types, one regarding the Transaction Cost Model,
including Joskow (1985) and Forbes and Lederman (2009); and the other regarding
the Property Rights Model, including Grossman and Hart (1986) and Baker and Hub-
bard (2004). Generally, they all examine problems based on incomplete contracts. To
my knowledge, not a great number of papers in this area have discussed internalizing
negative externalities of competition.
The film industry has always been a very popular research field for economists.
Hanssen (2002) examined revenue sharing in movie exhibition. In the silent film era,
film producers and distributors rented their films to exhibitors for flat fees, however,
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since the appearance of sound changed the structure of incentives in film exhibition,
revenue sharing by percentage became the norm. Hanssen (2009) looked into ver-
tical integration during the Hollywood studio era. It was found that run lengths
in theaters for releases by vertically integrated film producers, comparing with films
from other producers, were more likely to be altered ex-post. Other papers such as
De Vany and Walls (1996), discussed contracting problems in the film industry, Gil
(2007) and Gil (2009) explored vertical integration and ex-post re-negotiations among
distributors and cinemas. Very few articles about the film industry focused on release
date scheduling, along with vertical market structure and vertical integration. Corts
(2001) is the only paper that I know of which examines release date scheduling and
vertical market structure.
In this paper, following the idea of Corts (2001), I examine the effect of vertical
market structure on release date scheduling competition.1 In the film industry,
there are a great number of production companies but not very many distributors. A
possible reason is that it is very costly for a new distributor to build up its network, for
an existing distributor it has a great cost advantage for it has sufficient information
about the industry and the cinemas thus it is easier for it to negotiate contracts
with them. Therefore we can say there is a great barrier of entry for distributors,
at least comparing with producers. Producers, especially compared with the 1990s,
the number has increased a lot in the recent years. For both the producers and
distributors, one important decision in the industry is the release date. Demand
varies a lot according to seasonality, for instance, demand for movies are extremely
high during holidays and breaks, such as summer, Independence Day, Christmas and
1Vertical market structure is the combination of upstream and downstream firms, in this case,
producer and distributor. If two films have the same vertical structure, then they have the same
producer, and the same distributor.
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so on. During these times, people have more free time so they are more willing to
enjoy a film in cinemas. High demand is possible to attract more products, films in
this case, so it is very likely to see more films in a high demand window. However,
films that are released close together are likely to impose negative externalities on each
other due to intense competition. This paper focus on how vertical market structure
affects the release date scheduling of pairs of films. It is reasonable to predict that
for two films that share a common producer and a common distributor will increase
the number of weeks between their releasing dates, two films with the same genre
are also unlikely to be released closed to each other. On the other hand, if two films
have different producers and distributors, they are unlikely to be scheduled in a way
that internalizes the negative externalities and thus are likely to be relatively close
together. But the effects of only same producers or same distributors are not easy
to predict, it is hard to say for any two films within the same demand window if
they only have the production company or the distributor in common, whether their
release dates are close together. However, I find that using Cortss method on 2014-
2015 data the result is inconsistent with the results in Corts (2001), which similar
vertical structure no longer lead to efficient release date scheduling. Therefore I adjust
Cortss method by taking vertical integration between producer and distributor for
certain films into account and introducing this factor into the model, which sometimes
distributors are willing fund the production of the film so they have more power over
it, including setting the release date, then the results are aligned with the findings in
Corts (2001).
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the
background of the film industry related to this study. Section 2.3 presents the empir-




In order to show a film on the screens of cinemas, basically, it takes the ef-
forts of three different kinds of companies. Besides the cinemas or the exhibitors,
one is the production companies or producers, the other is the distributing compa-
nies, or distributors. There are many production companies in the industry, some
production companies are subsidiaries of a studio or a major studio, such as Warner
Brothers Pictures, which owns New Line Cinema and Castle Rock Entertainment,
Universal Pictures and Focus Features belong to Universal Studios and so on. Also,
there are other producers that are independent production companies, such as Scott
Rudin Productions, which does not have any parent companies. There are not as
many distributors as producers, but they are also either independent or owned by
major studios, such as Warner Brothers, Universal, Sony/Columbia and Weinstein
Company.
As mentioned in Corts (2001), the financing and distribution arrangements be-
tween film production companies and distributors take one of the five basic forms: in
house production/distribution, production-financing/distribution agreements, nega-
tive pickups, acquisition deals, and rent-a-distributor deals. For a specific movie,
there are at least two rights to a film that can be claimed, one is the ownership of the
copyright of the film, the other is the distribution right of the film in a certain area,
such as a country, the distributors of a film can be different in different countries, the
distribution right can be assigned to a distributor or be kept by the films owner. The
production companies (company) who provided financial support in the production
of the film can be recognized as the copyright owner.
The copyright owner is obviously the films residual claimant, which collects
the net profit of the film after the distribution payment, payments to actors, staff and
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other production expenses are deducted. On the other hand, the distributor, through
the contract with the producers, can also collect a portion of the films earnings.
According to Corts (2001), ”the most common form for a distribution deal is the net
deal, in which the distributor collects a distribution fee of 30% of gross rentals, then
recoups its print and advertising expenses from the remaining sum before transferring
the net revenues to the production companies.” Thus for a particular film, both the
production and distribution entities are residual claimants of the film, so both entities
have the incentive to maximize box office revenue.
The opening week is very crucial to a film’s box office revenue. In the 1990s,
on average, the proportion of the box office revenue responsible by the opening week
has increased consistently, and since 2010, this figure has been fluctuating around
32%. What is more, how a movie performs on the release day is very important for
it to build up its reputation. A good start would likely lead to a high revenue in
the future, and might let the cinemas be willing to show this movie longer. So, the
release date is fairly crucial for a movie and its box office revenue.
Also, clustering in film release can be a great disaster to films box office rev-
enues. This issue has been brought up by many scholars who have a great deal of
knowledge of the industry. This negative externality that the great number of films
impose on each other in high demand windows can be a serious problem. So the
efficient outcome for films with similar vertical structure involve reduced clustering
in release dates for these films. Since they are all residual claimants, both the pro-
duction companies and the distributors have the incentive to pick a good time slot
for their films. And, theoretically, two films in the same demand window with the
same producer and the same distributor are more likely to be released further away
for both producer and distributor have the same incentive to achieve an efficient out-
come. Also, for films which their producer and distributor that has the same parent
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company, it is even more likely to achieve an efficient outcome for it is less costly to
negotiate the release date. It is also worth mentioning that it is not uncommon for
distributors to fully or partially fund the production of a film. This is not because it
is too costly for these distributors to produce films themselves, since all major distrib-
utors are either producers themselves, or their parent companies are major studios
which own production firms. Potentially, there are two reasons of doing so. First,
the distributor believes this film could be a big success so they acquire full ownership
of the film to receive more revenue at the box office. Second, the distributor desires
full control over the film, including setting the release date. It needs to be pointed
out that when the producer and distributor of a film belong to different entities, their
interests might differ. For instance, if the producer is an independent producer, then
it is likely it only has this one film released in a certain demand window, so its goal
is to maximize the revenue of this one film. However, since all distributors are owned
by major studios, it is likely that it has multiple films released in this demand win-
dow, therefore its objective is certainly not to maximize the revenue of one film but
the joint revenue of all its films. Thus, this gives the distributors a strong incentive
to alter the vertical structure of films by vertical integration. More details will be
discussed in the following section.
2.3 Empirical Analysis
I acquire the release date of all wide release films in 2014 and 2015 from Box
Office Mojo, and the ownership information of production companies and distributors
and the genre of the films from IMDB and IMDBPro.2 In my analysis, according
2Wide release films refer to films that are exhibited in at least 600 cinemas in the U.S. and
Canada.
60
to A. D. Murphys historical index, which was introduced in Vogel and L. (2015),
shown in Figure 2.1 3, I divided the 52 weeks into ten demand windows, depending
on the demand peaks in a year. Additionally, Figures 2.2 and 2.3 show weekly film
attendance in 2014 and 2015. Details are presented in Tables 2.1 and 2.2. I paired
the films within the same demand window, so when it comes to a pair of films, I only
consider the films within the same demand window. Since only two films released
in the same time period are possible to compete with each other, and it is hard to
imagine that a film released on Easter to compete with a film released around the
4th of July in cinemas. Details shown in Table 2.2.
Since I am examining the effect of vertical market structure and vertical in-
tegration on competition of release date scheduling, it is reasonable to focus on the
film pairs and define the dependent variable of my empirical model as GAP, which is
the number of weeks between the release dates of a film pair. In the U.S., films are
usually released during weekends, so if two films were released on the same weekend,
GAP=0. If a film was released a week later than another, then GAP=1 for this pair.
Occasionally, there will be some films that are released on weekdays, for these films,
I consider them being released on the following weekend, as Corts (2001) did. Also,
for some films, like the ones targeting the Oscars, they might want to be released in
the previous year in order to be qualified but they also want to avoid the competition
with the great number of films at the end of the year, so they usually have two release
dates, one is for limited release and the other is for wide release. Limited release is
often for award qualification or to see the response from the demand side in order to
predict if the film would perform well after wide release. A film is considered wide
3With 52 weeks of a year on the horizontal axis and average film attendance on the vertical axis,
this diagram is made by Murphy based on aggregate data of the US film industry throughout several
decades.
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released when it is shown in 600 cinemas or more in the U.S. and Canada. In my
analysis, I only consider wide release, so the release date of all films are wide release
dates.
For the independent variables, first, I consider genre (SG) of the films. Films
with the same genre are more unlikely to be released close to each other, and SG=1
if the films in a film pair share the same genre, SG=0 otherwise. Partially following
Corts (2001) which he followed the Hollywood Reporter, I specify these following
genres: comedy, drama, action, family, thriller, romance, horror, animation, western,
disaster, musical, documentary, and comedy/drama. I added the last four which I
found in my data set many films fall into these categories but do not fit well into any
of those former ones. For example, Dumb and Dumber and Driving Miss Daisy can
be both labeled comedy, but the former is a Jim Carrey style intense comedy, and the
latter is a comedy drama which has interesting lines and funny plots but still talks
about serious problems, so it is hard to consider these two films as close rivals which
share the same genre. Also, I have considered the effect of major stars. I consider
the top actors/actresses with the highest asking prices and earnings in 2014 as major
stars. These information are just estimated information from Forbes so they might
not be very accurate, but it should be enough to define the ranking among all influ-
ential actors/actresses, their popularity and impact on box office revenues. So the
stars are: Jennifer Lawrence, Scarlett Johanssen, Anne Hathaway, Sandra Bullock,
Robert Downey Jr., Bradley Cooper, Adam Sandler, Dwayne Johnson, Johnny Depp,
Leonardo Dicaprio, Matthew McConaughey, Matt Damon, Chris Hemsworth, Daniel
Craig, Ben Affleck, Liam Neeson, Mark Wahlberg, Christian Bale and Tom Cruise.
So for a certain film pair, if one of the films had at least one of the actors/actresses
mentioned above then the variable STARS=1 for this pair, STARS=0 otherwise.
Films with stars are very likely to be blockbusters, which aim for high demand win-
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dows to gain high box office revenues therefore are possible to care less about release
date competition which may aggravate this matter. In addition, I included demand
window dummies as well.
Besides the dependent variables I mentioned above, there are four other vari-
ables, which are the most important ones. For the two films in a film pair, SDSP=1
means they have the same distributor and the same production company, DDSP=1
and SDDP=1 stand for different distributors same producer, and same distributor
and different producers, respectively. DDDP is the dropped dummy variable which
represents different distributors and different producers.
Following Corts (2001), I model GAP as a linear function of SG, STARS,
dummy variables for production and distribution relationships and dummy variables
for demand windows and estimated by OLS, so for film pair j,
GAPj = α + β1SGj + β2STARSj + β3SPSDj + β4SPDDj + β5DPSDj + β6DWj + εj,
(2.1)
where DWj is the vector of dummy variables for demand windows. Also, concerning
heteroskedasticity, robust standard errors are reported in Tables 2.3 and 2.4. In my
first set of regressions, I followed the method in Corts (2001), which he defined two
films have the same producer only if the lead producers for both films are either the
same or belong to the same parent company and same distributor as if the distributors
are either the same or share the same parent company. So, for example, two films,
Scott Rudin Productions is the lead producer for both of them and they are both
distributed by Universal Pictures, then SDSP=1 for this pair. For another film pair,
if one is produced by Focus Features and distributed by Warner Brothers Pictures,
and the other is produced by Universal Pictures and distributed by New Line Cinema,
for this pair we also have SDSP=1, since Universal Pictures is the parent company of
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Focus Features and Warner Brothers own New Line Cinema. The results are reported
in Table 2.3. The results from the method in Corts (2001) with 2014-2015 data is not
consistent with the results in Corts (2001). In Table 2.3, the control variable SG is
significant and its coefficient is positive, which means that films with the same genres
are released on average 0.24 weeks away from each other. It makes sense for films tend
to stay away from close rivals in order to avoid unnecessary competition. The control
variable STARS is insignificant and its coefficient is negative, the negative part is
consistent with reality which movies with major stars are usually blockbusters and
blockbusters tend to show up together in high demand windows such as summer break
holidays. However, different from the results in Corts (2001), the control variable
SDSP, which is the most important variable, is insignificant, which means there is
no strong evidence demonstrating joint distribution and joint production can reduce
clustering in release date scheduling, mitigate competition and lead to an efficient
outcome.
With the different results from the same method, is the prediction which sim-
ilar vertical structure can ease the competition in films release date scheduling and
achieve efficient outcome wrong? In order to answer this question, I went back and
examined the data again. I found that most films have multiple production compa-
nies, and for a great number of them, their distributors is also one of the producers.
For these films, if the distributor is also the lead producer, then this is an in-house
production. But, there is a number of films, which their distributors is not the lead
producer, but the last or second to the last. So, I thought that vertical integration
for a certain film might have an impact, then I applied a new method, which is for a
certain film, if its distributor is also one of the producers, then count the distributor
also as a lead producer, even if the lead producer is another company. For example,
if there is a film, distributed by Warner Brothers, produced by Scott Rudin Produc-
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tions, an independent producer, but with Warner Brothers as the fourth producer,
then according to Cortss method, if we pair this film with another one both produced
and distributed by Warner Brothers, then we would get SDSP=0 and SDDP=1 for
this pair. Yet, with my method, because the distributor Warner Brothers is also a
producer of this film, so Warner Brothers and Scott Rudin Productions are both lead
producers. Thus for this film pair, we see these two films have the same producer and
the same distributors, thus SDSP=1. So, I ran the regression based on this method,
the results are reported in Table 2.4.
One thing I need to clarify is that setting the distributor also as a lead producer
does not mean the distributor is participating in production other than funding, it
only means that the distributor now has more power than just being a distributor
since it enjoys the ownership of the film by financing production. Almost all of the
distributors in the industry either own a production company or its parent studio
owns one which they can produce films of their own so they do not really need to be
a minor producer, so there must be an important reason for the distributors to do
this. Like mentioned above, there are two potential reasons for a distributor to do so.
First, if the distributor believes this film is going to be a success at the box office, then
it would be a great incentive for the distributor to partially or even fully finance the
production to gain ownership over the copyright in order to receive a greater share of
box office revenue. 4 The second reason is the distributor desires full control over the
film, including setting the release date. When the producer and distributor belong
to different owners, their interests might not be completely aligned. Like mentioned
previously, it is very likely that an independent producer has only one film released in
4This happened with ”Paranormal Activities”. It was an independent production, distributed
by Paramount, after this film received a huge box office success with a extremely small budget,
Paramount fully financed all the future series.
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a certain demand window, but since a distributor is either owned by a major studio
or a major studios itself, it is likely to have multiple films released. So the goal of
this independent producer is to maximize the box office revenue of this single film,
but the distributor’s objective is to maximize the joint revenue of all its film. Thus,
it will give the distributor a strong incentive to internalize this incomplete contract
issue by vertical integration, which should be the reason in this study.
In Table 2.4, the independent variables SG and STARS are still significant
and insignificant, respectively, and their coefficients are still positive and negative,
respectively, which is consistent with previous predictions. For SDSP, we can see
now it is significant at 1% level, with a coefficient 0.37 indicates for two films with
same producers and same distributors are released about 0.37 weeks away from each
other, which is consistent with the prediction. What is more, in Cortss results,
the control variable SDDP was significant, yet no explanation was provided. With
my method, SDDP is no longer significant, and I believe the significance of SDDP in
Cortss is because he did not consider the possible effect of vertical integration between
producers and distributor for a certain film.
One possible explanation of the differences between the two sets of results is
that Corts (2001) focused on the film industry during 1994-1995. At that time period,
there were less production companies then in 2014-2015, so it would be much easier for
two films to have the same lead producer, since the total number of wide release films
in a year almost did not change (150 to 160 per year). Thus, in Cortss results, films
that were both joint produced and joint distributed can internalize the externalities
of competition in release date scheduling. On some level, we can see Cortss results
as a special case, which is when there are relatively less movie producers in the
market. However, with many more producers in the industry in recent years, joint
production has been more difficult to realize. Luckily, there is a method to internalize
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externalities, which is vertical integration. The method I apply examines the vertical
integration activities concerning the powers over films. For a certain movie A, if
its distributor and producer, which are all residual claimants of the movie, are not
the same company, then before certain decisions of the movie are made, negotiation
between the two parties is needed and a great transaction cost might be involved.
The distributor might have another movie B released in the same demand window
and considering the joint benefit of both movies the distributor would not like this
movie A to be released close to B, but for some reason the producer might desire to
release A on the same weekend as B. So, one smart thing for the distributor to do
is vertical integration, internalize the externality, contract with the producer, ask to
be a minor producer, acquire the power to set the release date, and then compensate
the producer. So far, this explanation can explain the difference in results, and the
results can also be seen as a support to this hypothesis.
2.4 Conclusion
Following the idea of Corts (2001), this paper examines the effect of verti-
cal market structure and vertical integration of distribution and production on the
competition of release date scheduling in the U.S. film industry. The evidence sug-
gests vertical integration can be applied to result in both joint production and joint
distribution to internalize the externalities in competition across a set of products,
this tend to reduce the clustering of their films release. Thus complicated upstream
or downstream structures generally do not achieve efficient outcomes and lead to
more intense competition in release date scheduling. This conclusion is consistent
with Corts’s findings after vertical integration is applied and also with other papers
concerning vertical integration. Thus following Cortss contributions, I presented a
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different method to examine the problem of competition in film release dates and
provided a complete explanation in this paper.
In the future, in order to extend the research, I would like to examine the
release date scheduling competition problem and the effect of vertical market structure
in Chinese film markets, and see if the same conclusion can be reached, or if there
are other interesting underlying reasons that might cause different results.
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2.5 Figures and Tables
Figure 2.1: A. D. Murphys Historical Index
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Figure 2.2: Weekly Film Attendance in 2014
Figure 2.3: Weekly Film Attendance in 2015
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics for Revenue in Each Demand Window in 2014 and
2015 ($ Million)
Year Statistic President’s Day Easter Memorial Day Independence Day Midsummer Labor Day Fall 1 Fall 2 Thanksgiving Christmas & New Years
2014 Mean 147.4 169.3 216.7 226.9 216.4 108.6 141.1 157.6 209.9 198.3
SD 41.9 22.0 34.4 30.8 28.7 28.0 27.5 34.4 54.1 79.8
2015 Mean 161.8 178.3 199.4 286.6 215.8 107.8 159.4 141.9 200.1 253.1
SD 57.9 65.5 30.2 72.9 30.8 12.1 22.5 39.3 60.9 151.4
Table 2.2: Summary Statistics for Each Demand Window in 2014 and 2015
Year Window No. Week No. Films No. Film Pairs No. SDSP Corts’s Method No. SDPS Altered Method No. SG No. STARS GAP Mean GAP SD
2014 President’s Day 5 13 78 1 8 8 1 1.54 1.06
Easter 9 25 300 7 9 41 1 2.71 1.87
Memorial Day 4 11 55 0 2 7 3 1.42 0.97
Independence Day 6 14 91 3 6 12 1 2.03 1.38
Midsummer 5 16 120 1 5 14 1 1.52 1.06
Labor Day 4 14 91 1 1 17 0 1.46 1.06
Fall 1 3 9 36 1 2 7 1 1.06 0.78
Fall 2 5 16 120 3 3 17 3 1.57 1.12
Thanksgiving 3 7 21 0 0 4 0 0.57 0.49
Christmas & New Years 8 24 276 4 12 41 11 2.39 1.67
2015 President’s Day 5 15 105 3 3 16 0 1.71 1.18
Easter 9 24 276 5 9 28 3 2.94 2.04
Memorial Day 4 9 36 0 4 4 1 1.33 0.88
Independence Day 6 15 105 9 9 8 0 2.15 1.46
Midsummer 5 15 105 1 3 18 1 1.54 1.09
Labor Day 4 13 78 0 1 11 0 1.38 0.98
Fall 1 3 11 55 0 0 6 3 0.84 0.65
Fall 2 5 18 153 3 8 12 3 1.48 1.04
Thanksgiving 3 12 66 0 1 22 0 0.94 0.72
Christmas & New Years 8 23 253 1 6 48 10 2.70 1.91
Total 104 304 2420 43 92 341 43
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Chapter 3
Higher Demand, Fewer Films:
Evidence from the U.S. Film
Market
3.1 Introduction
Many articles have looked into product quantity and variety. Spence (1976)
examined the effects of fixed costs and monopolistic competition on the selection of
products and product characteristics in a set of interacting markets. Mankiw and
Whinston (1986) investigated the fundamental reasons behind the entry bias in in-
dustries which fixed set-up costs are involved. They concluded that entry is more
desirable to the entrant than the society if it causes a reduction in incumbents’ out-
puts, which will result in excessive entry in the industry. Furthermore, they also
looked into product variety and the number of firms and products. Berry and Wald-
fogel (2001) examined the effect of mergers on the number of products and their
variety in radio broadcasting. They discovered that mergers between stations will re-
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duce station entry, therefore products, and increase the number of formats available
relative to the number of stations, which a more concentrated market would lead to
more varieties. Most of these papers explored the effect of mergers and entry, and
they mostly focused on the impact on social welfare.
The film industry has always been a very popular research field for economists,
and past literature has examined many aspects of the industry. Hanssen (2009)
looked into vertical integration during the Hollywood studio era. It was found that
run lengths in theaters for releases by vertically integrated film producers, comparing
with films from other producers, were more likely to be altered ex-post. Corts (2001)
examined the release-date scheduling of motion pictures in 1995 and 1996 in the US
and found that complex vertical structures involving multiple upstream or down-
stream firms generally do not achieve efficient outcomes in movie scheduling. Einav
(2010) developed an empirical model to study the release date timing game between
film distributors, and the results indicate that box office revenues would increase if
the distributors moved the release dates of some films one or two weeks away from
major holiday weekends since there are too many films crowded around. However,
none of these studies explored the effect of market demand on product quantity and
variety.
When demand increases, since there is more space for potential profit, it is
expected that there will be more entry therefore more products and more varieties
among them. However, this is not true in the film industry. Based on the findings in
Corts (2001) and Wang (2019), I discover that if the expected demand of the release
week increases, the number of films released will decrease. Furthermore, the variety
among these films will decline as well. To test these theoretical predictions, I develop
empirical tests to confirm the effect of expected demand on the number and variety
of films and the ”crowding out” effect of big budget film on other films, with data
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collected from multiple film information websites which include information on all
wide release films from 2007 to 2016. I contribute to the literature by examine this
higher demand, fewer goods phenomenon, and provide explanations to this previously
not examined situation which contradicts economic expectations.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 presents the
theoretical deduction based on the findings in Corts (2001) and Wang (2019). Section
3.3 introduces the data and variables used in the empirical tests. Section 3.4 shows the
empirical analysis and results. Section 3.5 concludes. Additional details are included
in the Appendix.
3.2 Theoretical Deduction
It is expected that there would be more entries and products as well as the
varieties of these products as demand increases. However, this is not the norm in the
U.S. film market. Wang (2019) revealed that if the expected demand of the release
week increases, the quality and the quality difference between the films released that
week will increase, as well as the variety difference between them. In this paper,
production budget and genre were used as proxies for quality and variety, respectively.
When release week demand is expected to be high, there should be a great difference
in quality between the high quality film and low quality films. In order to mitigate
the impact of the disadvantage in quality, the low quality films will differentiate
themselves even more in terms of genre. Therefore, genre differences are greater when
expected demand rises. However, since the producers of other films want their films’
genres to be more different from the high quality film, there will be fewer options in
terms of genre left for them to choose. Hence, if the expected demand of the release
week increases, besides the one high quality film, the other films have fewer options
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in genre.
Corts (2001) examined the competition in film release date scheduling. It re-
vealed if two films have the same vertical structure, then their release dates will be
more separated, in order to avoid the unnecessary negative externality from compe-
tition. It also discovered if two films have the same genre, it is more than likely that
they will be released far away from each other in terms of release date, since films
with similar genre would seek to avoid direct competition with a close rival. In other
words, two films released in the same week are more than likely to have different
genres.
With the above conclusions provided by these two papers, I can reach two
inferences. First, if the expected demand of the release week increases, the number
of films released this week will decrease. From Wang (2019), it is known that the
films have fewer options in genre if the expected demand of the release week rises.
And according to Corts (2001), two films released in the same week tend to have
different genres. For there are fewer options in genre, and it is unlikely for films to
have the same genre, the number of films released in a certain week will drop if the
expected demand increases. Second, since the number of films released will decline
if the expected demand of that week increases, and two films released in the same
week tend to have different genres, thus the variety of films will decrease as well. The
variety of films decreases as the number of films drops.
When expected demand of the release week increases, the quality difference
between the high quality film and other films also increases. The other films will
differentiate themselves even more in genre to reduce the impact of the large quality
difference. But since they want to be further away from the high quality film in
terms of genre, they have fewer options left, and each film is ”one of a kind” in genre,
so there will be fewer films, and fewer variety. Thus in a week with high expected
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demand, the film with a high production budget ”crowds” many other films out of
the market with the huge advantage in quality. On the other hand, when expected
demand of the release week decreases, the quality and genre difference between the
films also decrease. Without the high quality film having a huge advantage in quality,
the other films do not need to differentiate themselves in genre, therefore they have
more options in terms of variety, and in this week there is likely to have more films
released, and more variety among them.
3.3 Data and Variables
For this study I collect data from Box Office Mojo, IMDb and IMDbPro. Box
Office Mojo provides release dates of all wide releases and number of tickets sold
each week. 1 I only focus on wide releases for they are responsible for most of the
box office revenue each week. IMDb and IMDbPro provide detailed information for
each movie, such as production budget, genre, producer, distributor and so on. The
dataset includes data of wide releases from January 2007 to December 2016, and
ticket sales numbers from January 1997 to December 2016.
In the empirical analysis, in order to test the predictions concluded above, I
will use Number as the dependent variable, which is the number of films released in
a certain week. Details are given in Table 3.1.
As for independent variables, Demand is the expected demand of the release
week, it is the main independent variable in the empirical test. I use weekly ticket
sales as a proxy for weekly demand of films. Demand is the actual demand of that
week, assuming that studios are very good at demand forecasting which they can
1A film is considered a wide release when it plays in 600 cinemas or more in the United States
and Canada.
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predict the actual ticket numbers. Studios consider the opening week as the most
important week, for the box office revenue each film receive in this week is responsible
for 30%-40% of its total box office revenue, which is also usually the highest weekly
revenue.2 Thus the expected demand of the first week should be the most important
factor that affects the choices of film makers. Table 3.1 suggests that on average 23
million people are expected to go see a movie each week, however, there is also a lot
of variation, which means the expected and actual demand vary greatly across weeks.
Demandn2 is the average demand of the two weeks after the release week. It is the
average number of tickets sold in the next two weeks. A film can still be very popular
in its second and third week, so the expected demand of the next two weeks may also
have an impact. The average of the expected demand of the next two weeks is also
around 24 million, but with a smaller variation.
Like in Wang (2019), I will again use dummy variables of public holidays
and summer as instrumental variables for the endogenous variables Demand and
Demandn2 in order to remedy the endogeneity issue, which the number of films
might also have an impact on weekly demand.
Figures 3.1 through 3.10 show the number of films and expected demand of
each week from 2007 to 2016, with the expected demand on the left vertical axis,
number of films released on the right vertical axis, and the weeks on the horizontal
axis. Figure 3.11 shows the 10 year average. It can be seen that when expected
demand is high, the number of films is low. Summary statistics are provided in Table
3.1.
2According to weekly box office revenue data of all wide releases in the U.S. from 2007-2016.
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3.4 Empirical Analysis and Results
The empirical analysis aims to examine the results in Section 3.2. It is sug-
gested that big budget high quality films released in high demand weeks tend to crowd
out other films, which these films with relatively low budgets tend to gather in weeks
with relatively low demand. So if expected demand increases, the number of films
released this week will drop, along with the variety among these films, and vice versa.
In order to test these hypotheses, I conduct several regressions to examine the
effect of expected demand. The first regression is to estimate the average effect of
weekly expected demand on the number of films released that week
Numbert = α + β1ln(Demandt) + β2ln(Demandn2) + β3Y eart + εt, (3.1)
where Numbert is the number of films released in week t, Demandt is the expected
demand of week t, Demandn2 is the expected demand of the next two weeks, and
Y eart are the year fixed effects.
A second specification is applied,
Numbert = α + β1ln(mxt) + β2Y eart + εt, (3.2)
where mxt is the production budget of the film with the highest budget released that
week. This regression is to test the ”crowding out” effect of the highest budget film
of the week.
One possible issue in the empirical analysis is heteroscedasticity. In order to
correct this problem and reach more precise estimates, I will use robust standard
errors for the OLS estimations and also FGLS estimations. Also, like mentioned
before, Demand and Demandn2 are likely to be endogenous. So I will also apply
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2SLS estimation for the first regression.
Estimation results are presented in Table 3.2. The first three columns are
results for the specification in Equation 3.1, using OLS with robust standard errors,
FGLS, and 2SLS, respectively, with actual demand Demand and Demandn2 as ex-
pected demand. The last two columns present the results for the specification in
Equation 3.2, by using OLS with robust standard errors and FGLS.
The OLS estimates in the first column shows if on average, expected demand
of a certain week increase by 1%, then the number of films released that week would
have a decline of 0.3593. The expected demand of the next two weeks has a great
effect, a 1% increase will cause a 0.7650 reduction in the number of films. The FGLS
estimates in the second column suggest similar results. In the third column, the
effect of expected demand on the number of films in the 2SLS estimation is no longer
significant, yet the effect of expected demand of the next two weeks is still consistent
with theory. There are a few possible reasons for the insignificance. First, in 2SLS
estimation, too much noise has been introduced into the model, causing the coefficient
to be insignificant. Second, from Figures 3.1 to 3.10, we can see that approximately
during weeks 46 to 52, the number of films increase as expected demand increase, this
is because for a number of films, in order to be qualified for the Academy Awards
next February or March, they need to be released before December 31st this year,
and since demand is expected to be high during the holidays, so many films, although
with a low production budget, choose to be released around this time. So during this
time period, the number of films increase as demand increases, and vice versa. Third,
according to Wang (2019), increase in expected demand of the next two weeks can
also encourage film budgets and budget differences to increase, so high budget films
are more likely to be released in weeks which demand is expected to be high now
and in the future. Therefore, many low budget films choose to release in weeks with
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high demand but followed by low demand weeks, which can be seen in Table 3.2, the
coefficient for expected demand of the next two weeks in all columns are negative and
significant.
The last two columns show the ”crowding out” effect of high budget films.
On average, if the production budget of the highest budget film released that week
increase by 1%, by OLS and FGLS estimation, there would be a 0.1929 or 0.2133
reduction. Since production budget of films increase as expected demand increases,
this result also confirms the theory proposed in Section 2. When expected demand
increase, the number of films released will decline, along with the variety among these
films.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper provides empirical findings regarding the effect of expected demand
on the number and variety of films in the U.S. film industry. The deductions from
results in previous literature show that if the expected demand of a certain week
increases, the high quality film released that week will have a greater advantage in
production budget since its budget differences with other films increase as expected
demand increases, it will ”crowd out” some other films with lower budgets, thus the
number of films released that week will fall. The variety of films will decline as well,
since films with the same genre are unlikely to release in the same week. If demand
is expected to decrease, the number of films will rise, along with the variety among
these films. The results from the empirical models confirm the deductions, it is shown
that expected demand and the production budget of the highest budget film released
has a negative impact on the number of films released, meaning that when expected
demand increases, the number of films will decline, and films with high budget have
81
a ”crowding out” effect on other films with relatively low budgets. I contribute to
the literature by providing an explanation to the higher demand, fewer goods and
varieties phenomenon in the U.S. film industry, an industry with differentiation in
product quality and variety, while lacking price variation.
My analysis, and its results, are applicable to other industries with similar
characteristics, such as video game software industry, which quality and variety dif-
ferentiation is observable, but no price variation at release. Therefore, the application
of this model in other industries is possible, and similar results can be anticipated.
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3.6 Figures and Tables
Figure 3.1: Expected Weekly Demand and Weekly Number of Films Released in 2007
Figure 3.2: Expected Weekly Demand and Weekly Number of Films Released in 2008
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Figure 3.3: Expected Weekly Demand and Weekly Number of Films Released in 2009
Figure 3.4: Expected Weekly Demand and Weekly Number of Films Released in 2010
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Figure 3.5: Expected Weekly Demand and Weekly Number of Films Released in 2011
Figure 3.6: Expected Weekly Demand and Weekly Number of Films Released in 2012
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Figure 3.7: Expected Weekly Demand and Weekly Number of Films Released in 2013
Figure 3.8: Expected Weekly Demand and Weekly Number of Films Released in 2014
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Figure 3.9: Expected Weekly Demand and Weekly Number of Films Released in 2015
Figure 3.10: Expected Weekly Demand and Weekly Number of Films Released in
2016
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Figure 3.11: Average Expected Weekly Demand and Average Weekly Number of
Films Released 2007-2016
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics for all Films and Weeks 2007-2016
Variables Observations Mean S.D. Min Max
Number 516 3.00 1.23 1 8
Demand 516 23,269,698 9,072,785 8,400,000 63,792,300
Demandn2 516 23,282,194 7,957,389 10,170,650 57,312,900
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Table 3.2: Weekly Results: Number of Films
Number OLS Robust S.E. FGLS 2SLS OLS Robust S.E. FGLS
ln(Demand) -0.3593* -0.3708** -0.3386
(0.2023) (0.1956) (0.3299)




N 516 516 516 516 516
R2 0.1355 0.1358 0.1288 0.0613 0.0625





Table A1: First Stage Results of 2SLS Estimation in Table 1.4
Variables ln(ExpDemand) ln(ExpDemandn2) ln(Demand) ln(Demandn2)
Valentines 0.2606*** -0.0624*** 0.3681*** -0.0770***
(0.0134) (0.0069) (0.0333) (0.0190)
Easter 0.0364*** -0.0520*** 0.2450*** -0.0554**
(0.0131) (0.0166) (0.0334) (0.0278)
Independence 0.8129*** 0.5271*** 0.8167*** 0.4352***
(0.0153) (0.0124) (0.0517) (0.0332)
Memorial 0.7357*** 0.3516*** 0.6570*** 0.1677***
(0.0223) (0.0133) (0.0428) (0.0280)
Summer 0.5657*** 0.4159*** 0.5839*** 0.3858***
(0.0121) (0.0106) (0.0201) (0.0178)
Labor -0.1701*** -0.3906*** -0.1526*** -0.3865***
(0.0327) (0.0103) (0.0365) (0.0183)
Thanksgiving 0.2658*** -0.1098*** 0.4406*** -0.2704***
(0.0277) (0.0192) (0.0235) (0.0243)
Christmas 0.7069*** 0.1197*** 0.9915*** 0.1668***
(0.0200) (0.0202) (0.0251) (0.0230)
Valentinesn2 -0.1053*** 0.1370*** -0.0837*** 0.2227***
(0.0164) (0.0076) (0.0281) (0.0157)
Eastern2 0.0570*** 0.0018 0.1587*** 0.1891***
(0.0105) (0.0143) (0.0208) (0.0207)
Independencen2 0.1603*** 0.1644*** 0.1482*** 0.1108***
(0.0200) (0.0116) (0.0337) (0.0254)
Memorialn2 -0.1812*** 0.015 -0.2475*** -0.1179***
(0.0266) (0.0118) (0.0277) (0.0304)
Summern2 -0.1175*** 0.0680*** -0.1244*** 0.1715***
(0.0128) (0.0110) (0.0186) (0.0176)
Laborn2 0.0594*** -0.2271*** 0.0275 -0.2475***
(0.0183) (0.0163) (0.0239) (0.0186)
Thanksgivingn2 0.2994*** 0.2735*** 0.1636*** 0.3782***
(0.0194) (0.0228) (0.0266) (0.0233)
Christmasn2 0.2734*** 0.5754*** 0.1230** 0.6457***
(0.0379) (0.0201) (0.0515) (0.0251)
Sequel 0.0149 0.0142 0.0842*** -0.0068
(0.0148) (0.0116) (0.0190) (0.0138)
SP 0.0376*** 0.0174* 0.0579*** 0.0100
(0.0108) (0.0093) (0.0154) (0.0121)
N 1550 1550 1550 1550
R2 0.7014 0.7638 0.6035 0.6912
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A2: First Stage Results of 2SLS Estimation in Tables 1.5, 1.6 and 1.7
Variables ln(ExpDemand) ln(ExpDemandn2) ln(Demand) ln(Demandn2)
Valentines 0.2625*** -0.0754*** 0.4069*** -0.0832**
(0.0238) (0.0136) (0.0589) (0.0340)
Easter 0.0535** -0.0577** 0.3067*** -0.0622
(0.0239) (0.0283) (0.0742) (0.0459)
Independence 0.8147*** 0.5178*** 0.8205*** 0.4584***
(0.0262) (0.0215) (0.0822) (0.0554)
Memorial 0.7470*** 0.3542*** 0.7148*** 0.1827***
(0.0355) (0.0209) (0.0707) (0.0482)
Summer 0.5668*** 0.4085*** 0.6150*** 0.3595***
(0.0206) (0.0188) (0.0344) (0.0310)
Labor -0.2243*** -0.3987*** -0.1967*** -0.3950***
(0.0619) (0.0182) (0.0733) (0.0339)
Thanksgiving 0.2587*** -0.1265*** 0.4792*** -0.2913***
(0.0516) (0.0383) (0.0456) (0.0482)
Christmas 0.6914*** 0.0902** 0.8993*** 0.1280**
(0.0473) (0.0441) (0.0567) (0.0541)
Valentinesn2 -0.1040*** 0.1231*** -0.1069** 0.2061***
(0.0301) (0.0135) (0.0537) (0.0303)
Eastern2 0.0555*** -0.0133 0.1802*** 0.1708***
(0.0180) (0.0245) (0.0427) (0.0364)
Independencen2 0.1680*** 0.1685*** 0.1347** 0.1323***
(0.0331) (0.0186) (0.0541) (0.0418)
Memorialn2 -0.1533*** 0.0292 -0.2203*** -0.0747*
(0.0393) (0.0189) (0.0483) (0.0437)
Summern2 -0.1273*** 0.0566*** -0.1230*** 0.1520***
(0.0225) (0.0194) (0.0333) (0.0311)
Laborn2 0.0456 -0.2479*** 0.0242 -0.2677***
(0.0359) (0.0327) (0.0477) (0.0370)
Thanksgivingn2 0.3088*** 0.2896*** 0.1798*** 0.3986***
(0.0331) (0.0324) (0.0447) (0.0420)
Christmasn2 0.2867*** 0.5817*** 0.1434** 0.6782***
(0.0658) (0.0322) (0.0932) (0.0441)
N 516 516 516 516
R2 0.6893 0.7638 0.5712 0.6775
Note: The dependent variables and independent variables in the first stage of the weekly
regressions are the same, therefore, the results are the same.
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A3: First Stage Results of 2SLS Estimation in Tables 1.8 and 1.9
Variables ln(ExpDemand) ln(ExpDemandn2) ln(Demand) ln(Demandn2)
Valentines 0.2669*** -0.0523*** 0.3611*** -0.0720***
(0.0163) (0.0079) (0.0434) (0.0232)
Easter 0.0341** -0.0473** 0.2308*** -0.0548
(0.0152) (0.0207) (0.0359) (0.0356)
Independence 0.7936*** 0.5135*** 0.7978*** 0.4075***
(0.0207) (0.0180) (0.0631) (0.0386)
Memorial 0.7236*** 0.3480*** 0.6221*** 0.1439***
(0.0286) (0.0163) (0.0539) (0.0321)
Summer 0.5662*** 0.4222*** 0.5637*** 0.3986***
(0.0155) (0.0131) (0.0247) (0.0218)
Labor -0.1456*** -0.3885*** -0.1327*** -0.3811***
(0.0365) (0.0126) (0.0398) (0.0214)
Thanksgiving 0.2747*** -0.0974*** 0.4345*** -0.2579***
(0.0338) (0.0227) (0.0270) (0.0282)
Christmas 0.7156*** 0.1323*** 0.9136*** 0.1826***
(0.0226) (0.0223) (0.0297) (0.0253)
Valentinesn2 -0.1053*** 0.1425*** -0.0804** 0.2291***
(0.0201) (0.0094) (0.0327) (0.0186)
Eastern2 0.0601*** 0.0100 0.1524*** 0.1987***
(0.0129) (0.0179) (0.0235) (0.0254)
Independencen2 0.1458*** 0.1489*** 0.1664*** 0.1026***
(0.0238) (0.0157) (0.0407) (0.0312)
Memorialn2 -0.2010*** 0.0034 -0.2506*** -0.1471***
(0.0380) (0.0156) (0.0349) (0.0426)
Summern2 -0.1078*** 0.0781*** -0.1212*** 0.1847***
(0.0160) (0.0135) (0.0216) (0.0214)
Laborn2 0.0570** -0.2217*** 0.0109 -0.2413***
(0.0224) (0.0193) (0.0292) (0.0219)
Thanksgivingn2 0.2914*** 0.2610*** 0.1472*** 0.3591***
(0.0251) (0.0324) (0.0341) (0.0275)
Christmasn2 0.2647*** 0.5707*** 0.1089* 0.6261***
(0.0471) (0.0257) (0.0621) (0.0306)
SequelComp 0.0319** 0.0189 0.1037*** 0.0102
(0.0153) (0.0116) (0.0187) (0.0132)
N 1034 1034 1034 1034
R2 0.7055 0.7617 0.6204 0.6996
Note: The dependent variables and independent variables in the first stage of the two
estimations are the same, therefore, the results are the same.
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A4: First Stage Results of 2SLS Estimation in Tables 1.10 and 1.11
Variables ln(ExpDemand) ln(ExpDemandn2) ln(Demand) ln(Demandn2)
Valentines 0.2770*** -0.0291*** 0.3585*** -0.0525*
(0.0147) (0.0086) (0.0394) (0.0281)
Easter 0.0266** -0.0349 0.2079*** -0.0640
(0.0165) (0.0231) (0.0229) (0.0403)
Independence 0.8206*** 0.5579*** 0.8526*** 0.3587***
(0.0259) (0.0218) (0.0927) (0.0460)
Memorial 0.7659*** 0.3832*** 0.6509*** 0.1589***
(0.0218) (0.0187) (0.0726) (0.0442)
Summer 0.5670*** 0.4330*** 0.5531*** 0.4142***
(0.0168) (0.0150) (0.0318) (0.0269)
Labor -0.0658*** -0.3844*** -0.1050*** -0.3744***
(0.0238) (0.0122) (0.0223) (0.0179)
Thanksgiving 0.2928*** -0.0526** 0.4056*** -0.2397***
(0.0338) (0.0205) (0.0228) (0.0264)
Christmas 0.7529*** 0.1733*** 0.9509*** 0.2226***
(0.0158) (0.0173) (0.0218) (0.0181)
Valentinesn2 -0.1209*** 0.1544*** -0.0614* 0.2355***
(0.0215) (0.0125) (0.0345) (0.0193)
Eastern2 0.0618*** 0.0282 0.1785*** 0.2218***
(0.0139) (0.0191) (0.0225) (0.0257)
Independencen2 0.1784*** 0.1570*** 0.1967*** 0.0797
(0.0379) (0.0254) (0.0532) (0.0506)
Memorialn2 -0.2340*** 0.0007 -0.2764*** -0.1186
(0.0610) (0.0223) (0.0485) (0.0731)
Summern2 -0.1064*** 0.0788*** -0.1267*** 0.2033***
(0.0170) (0.0161) (0.0258) (0.0239)
Laborn2 0.0709*** -0.1984*** 0.0304 -0.2189***
(0.0217) (0.0179) (0.0285) (0.0209)
Thanksgivingn2 0.2964*** 0.1736*** 0.1971*** 0.3240***
(0.0272) (0.0497) (0.0371) (0.0309)
Christmasn2 0.2215*** 0.5654*** 0.0589 0.5724***
(0.0523) (0.0310) (0.0714) (0.0366)
SequelComp 0.0068 0.0003 0.0456* -0.0173
(0.0187) (0.0125) (0.0252) (0.0168)
N 907 907 907 907
R2 0.7427 0.7325 0.6759 0.6769
Note: The dependent variables and independent variables in the first stage of the two
estimations are the same, therefore, the results are the same.
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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